At the beginning of 2022 global food security was already in a state of deterioration as a result of the measures adopted to contain the COVID-19 pandemic, new or pre-existing conflicts, weather shocks and global economic slowdown. Around 735 million people were hungry in 2022 (Figure 1, left panel). The number of people affected by chronic hunger had grown by about 122 million since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. After remaining relatively unchanged since 2015, the prevalence of undernourishment in the world jumped from 8.0 in 2019 to 9.3 percent in 2021 and slightly decline in 2022 to 9.2 percent.[2]
An estimated 29.6 percent of the global population – 2.4 billion people – were moderately or severely[3] food insecure in 2022, meaning they did not have access to adequate food. This is still 391 million more people than in 2019, before the pandemic, and 745 million more compared to 2015 when the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda was launched. The prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity rose slightly in Africa, Northern America and Europe, and decreased non-significantly in Asia from 2021 to 2022. The only region showing encouraging progress is Latin America and the Caribbean, (where moderate or severe food insecurity decreased from 40.3 percent in 2021 to 37.5 percent in 2022, the equivalent of 16.5 million fewer people in one year), mainly in South America.
More than one-third of people facing moderate or severe food insecurity in the world in 2022 – over 900 million – were severely food insecure, indicating that they had run out of food at times during the year and, at worst, gone an entire day or more without eating. The prevalence of severe food insecurity based on the FIES provides additional evidence on the extent of hunger to complement the prevalence of undernourishment, although the indicators are based on very different methodologies and sources of data. Both indicators point to rising levels of severe food insecurity in the Caribbean, Western Asia, and almost all subregions of Africa from 2021 to 2022 (Figure 1, right panel). The estimates also suggest that 3.1 billion people globally could not afford a healthy diet in 2021, an increase of 112 million more people than in 2019.[4] Projections suggest that nearly 590 million people globally, equating to 8 percent of the world population, would still be undernourished in 2030, placing the world off track to achieve the Sustainable Development Goal 2 of Zero Hunger. Moreover, the disparity between men’s and women’s food security is 8.4 times as great as it was in 2018 and will likely increase with the compounding effects of the global food security crisis.[5] The fact that severe food insecurity rose across all regions should prompt a reflection on national policy priorities, as well as on the global responses. Rising hunger has reverberations upon other dimensions of malnutrition, including micronutrients deficiency, and impacts peoples’ ability to engage productively in the broader economy.
At the same time, a confluence of factors led to increasing food prices in 2020 and 2021. As demand started to recover in mid-2020 from the dramatic decrease in economic activity at the beginning of the pandemic, agricultural commodity prices rebounded from a 10-year low in May 2020. Increasing fuel and transportation costs added momentum to the surge in food prices. On the supply side, weather-related production shortfalls and logistics bottlenecks also contributed, though less significantly than the demand-side drivers.[6], [7]
Export restrictions contributed to increased price volatility and higher price levels in the early pandemic period.[8], [9] Fears of supply chain disruptions and production shortfalls because of pandemic-related restrictions led some countries to impose restrictions on exports of staple foods. However, compared to the 2007-08 global food price crisis, export restrictions affected a smaller share of world food trade as fewer countries had imposed restrictions and for shorter durations.[10]
Just as global economic conditions appeared to be recovering from the pandemic slowdown, the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in February 2022 sent another shock through global food and agricultural markets. The Russian Federation and Ukraine are among the most important producers and exporters of agricultural commodities in the world.[11], [12] In 2021, either the Russian Federation or Ukraine (or both) ranked among the top three global exporters of wheat, maize, rapeseed, sunflower seeds, and sunflower oil (Figure 2). In the same year, the Russian Federation also stood as a prominent exporter of fertilizers (see Section 6).[13]
Box 1: Levels of Food Insecurity Chronic hunger: is defined as the long-term or persistent inability to meet minimum food consumption requirements and is measured by the Prevalence of Undernourishment (PoU). Hunger: Hunger is an uncomfortable or painful physical sensation caused by insufficient consumption of dietary energy. Prevalence of undernourishment (PoU): an estimate of the proportion of the population that lacks enough dietary energy for a healthy, active life. It is FAO’s traditional indicator used to monitor hunger at the global and regional level, as well as SDG Indicator 2.1.1. Severe food insecurity: is the level of severity of food insecurity at which people have likely run out of food, experienced hunger and, at the most extreme, have gone for days without eating, putting their health and well-being at grave risk, based on the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES). Moderate food insecurity: refers to the level of severity of food insecurity, based on the FIES, at which people face uncertainties about their ability to obtain food and have been forced to reduce, at times during the year, the quality and/or quantity of food they consume due to lack of money or other resources. It thus refers to a lack of consistent access to food, which diminishes dietary quality, disrupts normal eating patterns, and can have negative consequences for nutrition, health and well-being. Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES): is the experience-based food security scale used to produce a measure of access to food at different levels of severity that can be compared across contexts. It relies on data obtained by asking people, directly in surveys, about the occurrence of conditions and behaviours that are known to reflect constrained access to food. FIES is the indicator used to monitor hunger for SDG Indicator 2.1.2. Acute food insecurity: food insecurity found in a specified area at a specific point in time and of a severity that threatens lives or livelihoods, or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration. These acute states are highly susceptible to change and can manifest in a population within a short amount of time, as a result of sudden changes or shocks that negatively impact on the determinants of food insecurity and malnutrition. Transitory food insecurity is a short-term or temporary inability to meet food consumption requirements related to sporadic crises, indicating a capacity to recover (for more definitions on acute food insecurity, see Box 2). FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2022. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2022. Repurposing food and agricultural policies to make healthy diets more affordable. Rome, FAO. |
Ukraine and the Russian Federation are key suppliers to many countries that are highly dependent on imported foodstuffs and fertilizers.[14], [15] Wheat imports of many countries situated in North Africa and Western and Central Asia are highly concentrated towards supplies from the Russian Federation and Ukraine due to geographical proximity. Overall, more than 30 net importers of wheat have been dependent on both countries for over 30 percent of their wheat import needs (Figure 3). Many of these countries fall into the Least Developed Country (LDC) group, while many others belong to the group of Low-Income Food-Deficit Countries (LIFDCs).
The immediate impacts of the war were spikes in the world food and fertilizer prices and a sharp reduction in grain exports by the Ukraine and the Russian Federation as Black Sea trade routes were disrupted, affecting also the procurement of crucial food supplies for humanitarian assistance (Figure 4). Nevertheless, recent WTO analysis suggests that throughout 2022 many countries were able to diversify their sources of food imports to some extent, thereby partly cushioning the impact of the shock and mitigating the consequences for food security.[16] Many of the countries hardest hit by this new shock were already suffering from previous conflict, climate, and economic shocks.
An early assessment of the impacts of the war in Ukraine and other developments on global food security in 2022 pointed to an additional increase of 10.7 million people facing chronic hunger compared with the pre-war baseline.[17] Millions of people that had slid into extreme poverty due to the economic slowdown caused by COVID-19 were further affected by the increase in food prices that followed the war in Ukraine. This shock hit them just as the post-pandemic economic recovery process had begun, with a potential impact on their nutrition and serious long-term implications for their health and longer-term wellbeing. This is particularly the case for the nutrition of women, young children and older people, as well as those who are disabled, with both immediate and long-term consequences particularly for poorer social groups in all nations.
The UN Secretary-General established the Global Crisis Response Group on Food, Energy and Finance (GCRG) in March 2022 to help decision-makers find global and systemic solutions to an unprecedented three-dimensional food, energy and finance crisis.[18] The GCRG estimated that 1.2 billion people live in countries affected by all three dimensions of the current crisis – finance, food, and energy – simultaneously, and issued three briefs with recommendations. These highlight the pathways through which rising food, fertilizer, and energy prices, higher interest rates, and increasing debt burdens are affecting vulnerable economies and people.[19], [20] One recommendation being implemented is the reintegration of Ukrainian and Russian food and fertilizer supplies into world markets through the Istanbul Agreements, namely the Black Sea Grain Initiative, signed by the Russian Federation, Türkiye, Ukraine and the United Nations Secretariat on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukrainian Ports, and the Memorandum of Understanding between the Russian Federation and the Secretariat of the United Nations on promoting Russian food products and fertilizers to the world markets.[21]
As alarming as the rise in the FAO Global Food Price Index was in 2022, it understated the economic pain inflicted upon the most vulnerable people and countries. Even though world price levels have decreased in recent months, net food importing developing countries continue to face affordability difficulties to meet their import needs. This is connected to the broader effects of both the pandemic and the war on global markets and macroeconomic conditions. The pandemic-induced economic downturn lowered the fiscal space available to many low-income countries to meet higher food and fuel import bills or to alleviate the impacts of higher costs on consumers through social programmes (Table 1).[22], [23] It was in response to this constraint that FAO put forward a proposal for the development of a Global Food Import Financing Facility (FIFF) to help countries pay for their import bills and meet their food import needs.[24] Spillover effects of monetary policies in developed economies, namely raising interest rates, put pressure on the currencies of vulnerable food importing countries to depreciate. Although food prices in world markets have decreased since their peak in the spring of 2022, the transmission of lower international prices to the domestic markets of many low-income countries is incomplete, and local food prices remain high and continue to severely hinder access to food.[25] While the global market situation may have improved over the past year, the economic situation of most low-income countries has not. The World Bank’s Food Price Inflation Dashboard shows that domestic food price inflation remains high across countries, and exceeds overall inflation in many.[26]
Food Security Assistance
As of March 2023, food security funding requirements are estimated at USD 18.8 billion, with 58.5 percent of funding requirements met, amounting to just under USD 11 billion.[27] Acute food insecurity continued to escalate in 2022, affecting up to 222 million people in IPC Phase 3 or above across 53 countries and territories, as of September 2022.[28],[29] Among those, around 45 million people in 37 countries were projected to have so little to eat that they would be severely malnourished, at risk of death, or already facing starvation and death (IPC Phase 4 and above).[30] This was a new peak from 2021, when the number of people suffering from acute food insecurity had already surpassed all previous records, affecting close to 193 million people in IPC Phase 3 and above in 53 countries and territories.
Box 2: Acute Food Insecurity Levels The IPC Acute Food Insecurity (IPC AFI) classification provides information to enable short-term actions by policy makers to prevent, mitigate or decrease severe food insecurity that threatens lives or livelihoods. The IPC Acute Food Insecurity classification differentiates between levels of severity of acute food insecurity, comprising five phases. Phase 1 indicates minimal to none acute food insecurity in a population; Phase 2 indicates stressed, Phase 3 indicates crisis level; Phase 4 indicates emergency levels; and Phase 5 indicates catastrophe or famine levels. The populations that require urgent action to meet their food needs are those in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Each phase has different characteristics and requires distinct interventions. In Crisis (IPC Phase 3), households are already facing food consumption gaps which are reflected in high or above normal acute malnutrition, or are only able to minimally meet their food needs by depleting essential livelihood assets or engage in crisis-level coping. People in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) face high levels of acute malnutrition and excess mortality due to lack of food, or resort to emergency coping strategies to mitigate large food consumption gaps. For populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), households have exhausted all coping strategies and face destitution, very high malnutrition, starvation and death. For more information on the IPC classifications, see https://www.ipcinfo.org/ IPC Global Partners. 2021. Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Technical Manual Version 3.1. Evidence and Standards for Better Food Security and Nutrition Decisions. Rome. |
Many of the countries experiencing the highest levels of food insecurity have suffered multiple compounding shocks. Out of 53 countries/territories affected by acute food insecurity, conflict is identified as the primary driver in 24 of these, economic shocks as the primary driver in 21, and weather extremes in 8 countries.[31]
In 2022, the number of people in acute food insecurity (IPC level 3+) in 55 countries is expected to rise by 24% if compared with the one presented in 2021. Nine countries faced important increases in the population in Crisis or worse (IPC level 3+): Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, Kenya, Sudan, Niger, Yemen, Malawi and Cameroon. Populations facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) can be found in Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Haiti, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen. Risks of Famine were raised in 2022 in Somalia and Yemen.
As of March 2023, prospects of persisting drought in East Africa have raised serious concerns about levels of acute food insecurity, with some areas of Somalia facing a risk of famine.[32] Very early, analyses show a probability that an El Niño event may materialize in the second half of 2023, with potential huge negative impacts worldwide, including dry spells during critical agricultural seasons in Southern Africa, West Africa, and Central America’s Dry Corridor, and flooding in the Horn of Africa.[33] Map 1 illustrates early warning hunger hotspots across the world.[34] This suggests that the needs will keep climbing in 2023.
Moreover the 2023 Global Report on Food crises indicates that there are 258 million people in acute food insecurity requiring urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance (IPC/CH 3 or above) in 58 countries. Of the 41 countries with IPC/CH analysis 0.38 million are in catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5), 35 million in emergency (IPC/CH phase 4) and 143.7 million in crises (IPC/CH Phase 3).
Gaps in Food and Livelihoods Support
While record levels of food assistance suggest a strong response to the humanitarian impacts of rising hunger, further analysis is needed to assess the amount and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance resources in offsetting the impacts of the food-energy-finance crisis.
The annual increase in the number of people facing acute food insecurity indicates a growing gap between humanitarian assistance needs and resources available. In 2021, 83 percent of humanitarian assistance to food sectors went to food crises driven by conflict and insecurity, an increase of more than 35 percent compared to the previous year. Allocations to countries primarily affected by economic and weather shocks went down significantly.[35]
The unabated increases from 2016 to 2021 in the same countries as assessed by the Global Report on Food Crises 2022 – Mid-Year Update indicate a failure to adequately address the underlying causes of food insecurity.[36] This results in an expanding humanitarian crisis, which in turn leads to an ever-increasing share of resources being devoted to humanitarian assistance. Fragile contexts receive insufficient levels of development assistance, and less than 11 percent is devoted to the food sectors in food crisis contexts, reflecting development actors’ reluctance to step up action in these contexts.[37]
The analysis of causal factors and the related financing flows is complicated by the fact that many countries are affected by multiple shocks that are mutually reinforcing, including conflicts and extreme weather conditions with direct impacts often (but not always) tending to be more localized and aggravating conditions at the local level.
Nevertheless, given the increasing share of resources devoted to conflict situations, it is reasonable to question whether the humanitarian assistance system is adequately prepared to address a future in which overlapping economic and weather shocks are more probable. The availability of adequate financial resources is a major consideration, but not the only one. Economic and weather shocks may be shorter-lived than the impacts of conflicts but reducing the susceptibility of vulnerable populations to economic and weather shocks would reduce the need for emergency assistance in response to future shocks.
The ability of the IPC to provide timely, consensus-based and context-specific information has never been more important than in the context of the current global food and nutrition crisis, driven by persistent conflict, natural disasters and high food prices. With global acute food insecurity and malnutrition on the rise, IPC is renewing its strategy and undergoing a transformation process to expand its geographic coverage and, at the same time, maintain the high quality of information that decision makers require for planning interventions in response to food and nutrition crises. To meet the unprecedented demand for actionable information for decision support to counter food insecurity and malnutrition, the IPC requires USD 48.6 million between 2023 and 2026, currently funded at only 26 percent. The USD 35.6 million required funding will allow the IPC to expand its reach, assure continued quality and improve processes of acute food insecurity and malnutrition analyses.[38] The third IPC Global Strategic Programme (2023-2026) aims at addressing critical gaps in the coverage of food and nutrition crises and envisions a substantial geographic expansion of the IPC, borne of global demand for the IPC in every region that has also been discussed within the GCRG.[39]
Financial Needs
One of the most urgent needs arising from the limited fiscal space many countries have for responding to food price shocks is additional support for vulnerable populations. The World Bank reports a fourfold increase in the number of social protection measures announced or implemented across 170 countries in response to food price inflation since April 2022.[40] An IMF analysis of 48 countries highly exposed to food insecurity revealed that the use of cash transfers is relatively rare despite evidence showing that social protection programmes are more effective at mitigating the impacts of price shocks on the poor than subsidies.[41]
There is need to act now to minimize the likelihood and consequences of households reducing the cost of food purchases by skipping meals or shifting consumption from highly nutritious to less nutritious foods as a way of coping with increased prices. People living in poverty need access to universal social protection and primary health-care services, which include nutritional support programmes that focus on both the prevention of acute malnutrition and its treatment. Improved access to targeted gender-responsive and nutrition-sensitive social protection is needed, particularly for women and children, including through safety nets in the form of cash and, if necessary, nutritious food.[42]
Yet the rapid acceleration of this crisis has challenged the capacity of the international community to respond. The UN Global Crisis Response Group raised concerns that the financial commitments to the World Bank and the IMF are inadequate to allow these institutions to fully utilize their rapid response capabilities. The IMF Food Shock Window provides transitory relief to countries experiencing balance-of-payments needs as a result of shocks related to the food crisis. It was envisioned as a third line of defense after increased donor funding and concessionary lending. The Food Shock Window was conceived to meet the needs of countries whose situation does not warrant an upper credit tranche (UCT)-quality programme due to the transitory nature of the shock, the urgency of needs, or because a country is not able to develop/implement a full programme. To date, six countries have been approved for programmes under the Food Shock Window. While others are in the pipeline, the number of beneficiaries is likely to be constrained by debt burden requirements and other considerations.
FAO’s proposal for a Food Import Finance Facility, which preceded the establishment of the IMF Food Shock Window, should be reconsidered given the experience with the latter. The multi-dimensional nature of this crisis has highlighted the linkages between food security and financial security. Lower international food prices are not necessarily being transmitted to local markets. Macroeconomic drivers will continue to play an important role in food security in part because of the economic implications of climate change. Further analysis is needed of whether food security considerations are adequately addressed in the existing financial rapid response mechanisms. The international community must unite forces to support all countries affected by rapidly rising hunger regardless of their development status or indebtedness levels.
Given already high debt levels in many vulnerable countries, there have been calls to consider debt relief for countries with debt that is assessed as being unsustainable. One model to consider is the temporary debt service relief provided under the G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) implemented at the time of the COVID-19 pandemic. The DSSI was established in May 2020 to help countries concentrate their resources on fighting the pandemic and safeguarding the lives and livelihoods of millions of the most vulnerable people. Forty-eight out of 73 eligible countries (http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2020/2020-g20-finance-0415.html#a2) participated in the initiative before it expired at the end of December 2021. According to the latest estimates, from May 2020 to December 2021, the initiative suspended USD12.9 billion in debt-service payments (https://www.bi.go.id/en/G20/Documents/G20-Communique.pdf) owed by participating countries to their creditors.[43], [44] The DSSI did not cover debt to private creditors.
With healthy diets out of reach for 3.1 billion people and 500 million mostly poor smallholder farmers facing an uncertain future because of climate change, national policies need to support a transformation of agriculture and food systems to enable them to promote healthy lives, prosperous rural communities, and climate-resilient production.[45] The current crisis reinforces the growing call for repurposing agricultural and food policy support. Currently, most agricultural and food policy support from national governments is not effectively targeted at meeting challenges related to sustainability objectives, such as climate change and nutrition, and preparing for the future. Redirecting these resources to ignite the sustainability transition can address multiple challenges in high- and middle-income countries. Low-income countries will need access to additional concessional resources to implement their transition. In the current context of constrained fiscal space, the countries with the most urgent need for transforming food systems have the least resources available to invest. There also remains scope for better inter-agency coordination on the ground to combine investments for scaled-up impact.
While governments are expending significant amounts of public resources to support food and agriculture, more can be achieved with these resources. The different support measures being used can distort prices, trade, production, and consumption decisions. Worldwide support to food and agriculture accounted for almost USD 630 billion per year on average over 2013-2018, and about 70 percent of this support was destined to production. About USD 111 billion were spent yearly by governments for the provision of general services to the sector, while food consumers received USD 72 billion on average every year. Most of the support producers get is through price incentives. This includes border measures on imports and exports (such as import tariffs, quotas, export taxes, bans or licensing, etc.) and market price controls (administered prices at which governments procure food from farmers, or minimum producer price policies).[46]
Import tariffs – taxes imposed on imported goods and services – are the most commonly used border measure, often employed to shield domestic producers from competition. Non-tariff measures (NTMs) are also widespread, while tariffs in agrifood trade have declined. Examples include export restrictions mostly targeting staple foods that are considered important for food security, such as rice, wheat, maize or pulses. Overall, support to agricultural production largely concentrates on staple foods, dairy and other animal source protein-rich foods, especially in high- and upper-middle-income countries. Rice, sugar, and meats of various types are the foods most incentivized worldwide, while producers of fruits and vegetables are less supported overall, or even penalized in some low-income countries.
FAO, in the 2022 edition of The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World, presents evidence that if governments repurpose their current composition of food and agriculture support resources to incentivize the production, supply and consumption of nutritious foods, they will contribute to making healthy diets less costly and more affordable, equitably for all. In addition, there will also be improvements towards reducing hunger and extreme poverty.
The results suggest that with the same money countries can unambiguously improve the affordability of healthy diets. This was the case for three modelling scenarios up to 2030, where simulations in which all countries in the world (i) reallocate fiscal subsidies from producers to consumers to bridge gaps in healthy consumption patterns; (ii) reallocate fiscal subsidies among producers to bridge gaps in healthy consumption patterns; and (iii) reallocate support through border price incentives (border measures and market price controls) to bridge gaps in healthy consumption patterns.
Trade-offs and negative outcomes could emerge from this repurposing in terms of GHG emissions, agricultural production levels and farm income. The magnitude and direction of the trade-offs do vary by region and income group, and therefore results and solutions will necessarily be country and context specific.[47]
Trade Measures
From the start of the war in Ukraine, the UN Secretary-General highlighted the need to restore global access to food and fertilizer supplies from Ukraine and the Russian Federation. With successful mediation by the United Nations and Türkiye, two agreements were signed in Istanbul on July 22, 2022, jointly referred to as the Istanbul Agreements. The Initiative on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukrainian Ports, commonly referred to as the Black Sea Grain Initiative, provided a framework for the resumption of exports of grain, other foodstuffs, and fertilizer (including ammonia) from Ukrainian ports. It allowed for the resumption of exports from three key Ukrainian Black Sea ports through a safe maritime humanitarian corridor. The agreement foresaw a duration of 120 days, renewable. In March 2023, the Black Sea Grain Initiative was further extended for an additional 60 days. Reducing uncertainty around the renewal and duration of the initiative would further contribute to market stability. To implement the Black Sea Grain Initiative, a Joint Coordination Centre (JCC – https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/background) was established in Istanbul, comprising senior representatives from the Russian Federation, Türkiye, Ukraine and the United Nations.
The Memorandum of Understanding between the Russian Federation and the Secretariat of the United Nations on promoting Russian food products and fertilizers to the world markets, commonly referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), provides assurances that the Russian Federation’s exports of food and fertilizer will not be impeded by measures imposed upon the country. This has a duration of three years.
The resumption of exports of grains and other foodstuffs under the Black Sea Grain Initiative increased predictability and helped to ease global price pressures. Under the Initiative, Ukrainian grain exports recovered significantly, but Ukrainian exports for the period between January and November 2022 remained 22 percent below those seen in 2021. As of July 2023, approximately 32.9 million tonnes of grains (predominantly wheat and maize) and other foodstuffs were exported under the Initiative.[48] According to UNCTAD, about 49 percent of maize exports were destined to developing countries, while 65 percent of total wheat cargo was destined to developing countries and least developed countries.[49] In addition to benefitting Ukrainian farmers, the agreement has allowed shipments to resume to traditional importers of Ukrainian grains, including countries in the Middle East, North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, as well as increasing the availability of grain supplies for humanitarian assistance in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan and other hunger hotspots. At the time of writing of this report, ammonia exports have not resumed through Ukrainian ports.
However, the latest extension of the Initiative expired on 17 July 2023, and the Russian Federation decided not to renew it. Prospects of additional renewal remain unclear despite continuing consultations and negotiations. The renewal of the Agreement and the resumption of BSGI are important for the global agrifood systems that are already under the pressure of climate shocks including but not limited to El Nino in 2023-24. Further decrease of Ukrainian agricultural products from the global market while the world is experiencing low level of stocks (e.g., grain) poses a huge risk to global food security.
In June 2022, at the 12th Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO), Members agreed on a Ministerial Declaration on the Emergency Response to Food Insecurity, the first Declaration on this topic in the Organization’s history.[50] In this, WTO Members recognized the vital role trade plays in improving food security and nutrition and resolved to make progress in promoting sustainable agriculture and food systems.[51] Members also committed to take concrete steps to facilitate trade and improve the functioning and long-term resilience of global markets for food and agriculture. Members further committed not to impose export prohibitions or restrictions in a manner inconsistent with relevant WTO provisions.
Improving market access would generally reduce the price of food and make it more accessible to poor consumers, particularly in developing countries. Likewise, the enhancement of transparency-related practices in connection with export restrictions, in conjunction with the commitment already undertaken at the 12th Ministerial Conference by WTO Members to sparingly resort to export restrictions and exempt purchases by the WFP for humanitarian purposes from such measures, would greatly enhance predictability and further improve the food security of importing countries.
Following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the UN, the G20, and the G7 were among the leading global voices calling for keeping international markets and trade in food and fertilizer open. They called for a resumption of exports from Ukraine and the Russian Federation and restraint in the use of export bans or restrictions that could add further volatility to markets. According to an analysis by IFPRI, export restrictions peaked in late May 2022 with measures by 23 countries covering 17 percent of global food and feed exports (on a caloric basis). By mid-July the amount of trade affected had fallen to 7.3 percent.[52] According to the WTO Secretariat, since the beginning of the war up until 14 March 2023, 100 export restrictions have been imposed on essential agricultural commodities by 29 WTO members and 6 observers. Of these, 92 applied to food and feed and 8 on fertilizer exports (Figure 5). Over the past 12 months, 29 measures have been phased out, meaning that there are currently 71 measures in force (66 on food and 5 on fertilizers) by 27 WTO members and 5 WTO observers. The export restrictions in force cover approximately USD 85 billion worth of goods.
As of 14 March 2023, the WTO had also identified 74 trade-facilitating measures by importing members in respect of food, feed, and fertilizers. Whereas 66 applied specifically to food and feed, 7 to food, feed, and fertilizers combined, and one specifically to fertilizers. These measures were introduced by 62 WTO members and 2 observers (including as members of economic/customs unions). Twenty-five of these measures have been phased out, bringing the total number of currently applied measures to 49 (42 on food and feed, 6 on food, feed, and fertilizers, and 1 on fertilizers), imposed by 59 WTO members and 2 observers.
Tracking trade measures implemented in response to the war remains a challenge, in particular as the direct link to the crisis is becoming less clear and because measures often undergo minor adjustments on a very regular basis. The WTO’s Trade Monitoring Exercise actively and regularly engages WTO Members in the verification of trade measures implemented so as to ensure the most up-to-date information is recorded.
Fertilizer Markets
Similar to global cereal exports, fertilizer exports originate from few countries, rendering world fertilizer markets concentrated and vulnerable to shocks (Figure 6). The Russian Federation is the largest exporter of nitrogenous fertilizers, the second largest supplier of potassic fertilizers and the third largest exporter of phosphorous fertilizers.[53] Most major exporting countries of nitrogenous fertilizers are also energy exporters, which is explained by the fact that their production is a highly energy-intensive process. While Ukraine did not feature as a key producer, it served as an important transit point, particularly for ammonia.
The outbreak of the war pushed the prices of energy and energy-intensive products sharply upwards, resulting in a severe decline in the affordability of fertilizers. To address high prices and supply shortages, FAO has developed tools to help countries navigate the complexities of fertilizer markets, enhance their ability to access scarce supplies, and ensure more efficient fertilizer use with soil nutrient maps.[54] Fertilizer prices have declined by more than 40 percent since hitting record highs in nominal terms in 2022, especially due to recent drops in natural gas prices and the reopening of fertilizer plants in Europe. Though prices remain almost twice the level of two years ago, this development is welcome news for producers.
While trade volumes from the Russian Federation remained largely unaffected in the first half of 2022, those from Belarus, a major supplier of potassic fertilizer, have shrunk notably.[55] Rather, resilient fertilizer exports from the Russian Federation were an important factor in containing fertilizer prices in the course of 2022.[56] Exports from the Russian Federation found new destinations in 2022, with India emerging as the largest destination market.
Despite this recent decline, fertilizer prices remain elevated, albeit with notable differences between different nutrients (sharp price declines in nitrogenous fertilizers, smaller declines for potassic fertilizers). While most large food-producing countries have secured their fertilizer needs for the 2022/23 season, there remain unmet import needs in many LDCs, notably in sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 7). This includes countries with food insecurity problems already, such as Malawi, Zimbabwe, Tanzania or Kenya. Higher input prices translate into higher production costs, lowering the use of inputs, yields and/or quality, and eventually leading to higher food prices.[57]
The Global Fertilizer Challenge was launched by the United States of America, the European Union, and Germany, among others, at the June 17 Major Economies Forum, to raise USD 100 million by COP27 to help low- and middle-income countries address the global fertilizer shortages. As of November 2022, the Challenge had raised USD 135 million in new funding for fertilizer efficiency and soil health programs to combat fertilizer shortages and food insecurity. Of this amount, USD 109 million is new public funding that will be used to expand fertilizer and soil health programs in sub-Saharan Africa and in key middle-income countries outside the continent.
In September 2022, France launched the Save Crops Operation, which aimed at facilitating fertilizer access by vulnerable countries.[58] The initiative reiterated that fertilizers were exempt from the sanctions regime and committed to addressing potential over-compliance to sanctions by the private sector through outreach and letters of comfort. It committed to provide financial and logistical support to the Africa Trade Exchange (ATEX) mechanism to facilitate the purchase of fertilizers. The initiative also launched an emergency fertilizer purchasing mechanism to ease African farmers’ access to fertilizers and facilitated donations for fertilizer procurement to Africa. Within the context of the Save Crops Operation, FAO and the WTO published a joint report on global fertilizer markets and policies, which provided a global outlook on markets, export restrictions, and mapping fertilizer-related measures across broad policy categories.[59]
Further Actions Needed Across Fertilizer Markets
Fertilizer is one of the most complex stories to emerge from the Ukraine crisis. The disruptions in global fertilizer markets are severe, wide-ranging, and likely to continue long enough to impact multiple growing seasons. The sector’s complicated structural dynamics defy easy or quick solutions. Short-term solutions to fertilizer shortages come with significant trade-offs. Supply constraints in global markets limit the ability to support any group of countries without affecting the availability of fertilizer for other countries.
In Africa, contractions in fertilizer use would have severe ramifications on the food security of some agriculture-dependent rural areas where food insecurity challenges are particularly pronounced. Prohibitive international prices, fast depreciation of currencies against the US dollar, appreciation of the Russian ruble (which makes Russian exports more costly), high levels of indebtedness, as well as inefficient transportation and marketing infrastructure, give rise to concerns that many African countries will not be able to afford purchasing fertilizers in international markets without external support.
Food and fertilizer exports from the Russian Federation are excluded from the sanctions that have been imposed by 33 countries following the war in Ukraine.[60],[61] They are also largely excluded from associated restrictions on financial transactions and transport, though restrictions on individuals and/or companies can reverberate upon these. Despite these exclusions, overall uncertainty about the application and operation of sanctions may have had a hindering effect on fertilizer trade. The United States and the EU have attempted to counteract the uncertainty through official communications and written assurances to shippers (e.g., comfort letters) clarifying the application of sanctions.[62]
More efforts are needed to reassure the private sector on this matter and thus enable the continuation of business and, where necessary, the establishment of alternative trading hubs and routes. These efforts are particularly important for the African continent that relied on European trading hubs and routes to access food and fertilizers prior to the outbreak of the war (as seen for instance in Figure 3). Such efforts should go together with actions to support importing countries to meet higher transaction costs resulting from market disruption and fragmentation. In this context, it is important to underline that the international community is well-equipped to address food crises that emerge from affordability issues, and that food crises that derive from availability constraints must be prevented.
While the IMF’s Food Shock Window eligibility criteria allows countries to draw on these resources to meet rising fertilizer import costs, at the time of writing this report only four African countries had a Food Shock Window approved. Of these, three countries had drawn on these additional funds to meet rising costs of both food and fertilizers.[63] More analysis is needed to shed light on the underlying causes for apparent low response by countries to take up these funds, their policy options and choices as well as the constraints faced by African countries and to enable them to access the agricultural inputs. The African Union is organizing the Africa Fertilizer and Soil Health Summit in June 2023. The Summit will adopt a 10-year action plan to address Africa’s expanding fertilizer crisis. The action plan will focus on improved efficiency, financing, fertilizer policy, and soil health. In this regard, every effort must be made to support this dialogue and the implementation of meaningful actions.
FAO has developed a “fertilizer neediness index” to inform international efforts to support and prioritize initiatives that aim to ensure that African countries are able to access international fertilizer markets, either through the provision of financing facilities to purchase fertilizers or through outright donations.[64] This index considers a number of indicators, including the country’s balance-of-payment situation, the severity of food insecurity, as well as other factors that shape the ability to purchase fertilizer at market conditions.
Urgent steps need to be taken to make fertilizer more accessible and affordable. Especially within Africa, internal trade and logistics barriers raise intra-regional trade costs of African-produced fertilizer and undermine trade efficiency within the continent.[65] Investments in trade infrastructure and trade facilitation measures will help the regional market to function more efficiently.
For resource-poor smallholder farmers, targeted and tailored interventions are needed to provide support in weathering the crisis and planting for upcoming seasons with enough fertilizers and other agricultural inputs, while maintaining livelihoods. However, the search for longer-term solutions should also focus on increasing soil fertility and fertilizer use efficiency and reducing the environmental impact of fertilizers. There is no single solution to all soil fertility problems, but a portfolio of options can be employed. Recycled nutrient sources are alternatives to increase soil fertility. Animal manure, urban wastes, wastewater, algal biomass, compost, and digestates, among other sources, can be recycled to the plant nutrient cycle after consumption by humans or animals, as by-products of food processing or as plant residues returned to the soil. More – and longer-term – efforts and investments are needed to develop these options into viable alternatives for farmers.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The currently fragile food security situation is one dimension of a global food, energy, and financial crisis affecting every region of the world. Our humanitarian assistance system, already overstretched by ongoing conflicts and climate-related disasters, is facing even greater demands in 2023. Financial support, while increasing, has not kept pace with the needs.
The consequences of soaring inflation and mounting debt burdens are spreading the food security crisis well beyond those countries that have been suffering from acute food insecurity for successive years. Countries that were on a positive path to achieving the food security and nutrition targets of the SDGs are seeing poverty levels rise, while their ability to provide assistance to their populations is undermined by increasing debt, falling revenues, and depreciating currencies.
The global community, including the G20, has responded to the current crisis with humanitarian assistance, new initiatives and political commitments. The global response prioritized keeping food supply chains functioning, avoiding export restrictions, re-opening Black Sea trade routes, strengthening social safety nets, and continuing to invest in building sustainable food systems. Progress has been made on all these fronts, but any additional supply shocks could turn the current food access crisis into an availability one.
The main drivers of food crises – lack of adequate investments in agrifood systems and rural areas, research and development, direct impacts from conflict and insecurity, extreme climatic events, and economic slowdowns and downturns – are all expected to persist in 2023 and beyond.
A return of global economic growth will ease the crisis, but it is not sufficient either to alleviate the current suffering or to prevent future shocks from piling additional pain on vulnerable populations. Much more needs to be done to address the root causes of hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition and to make safe, healthy diets more affordable for all.
The current multi-dimensional crisis underscores the potential for global macroeconomic conditions to undermine food security and nutrition goals and the need for a swift and coordinated global financial and policy response. It is important to move beyond a sector-specific discussion of food security and consider how the development finance architecture can be improved to support investments that will address the underlying causes of food insecurity, promote sustainable and inclusive economic growth in rural areas and reduce the potential for financial stress to lead to increased hunger and food insecurity.
Recommendations 1. Emergency humanitarian assistance: Funding must keep pace with the needs. More funds are needed for emergency food and livelihood operations and for other emergency measures that preserve livelihoods and reduce future short-term needs. 2. Social safety net programmes: An integrated, people-centered policy approach is needed, which must include food-related policies. The countries with the greatest need have the fewest resources and the smallest capacity to protect vulnerable households. Social safety net programmes need to be improved and expanded to contribute towards the realization of the right to food, facilitate access to food for the poor and vulnerable, alleviate hardship and promote well-being. 3. Increasing resilience: Key to building the shock-absorptive capacity of an agrifood system is diversity in food sources, diversity in actors in food supply chains, including small and medium agrifood enterprises, efficient transport networks, effective early warning systems, early action plans and social protection, and affordability of a healthy diet for all households, particularly the poorest and most vulnerable. 4. Fertilizer: Urgent action is needed to facilitate access to fertilizers for farmers in vulnerable areas, while also increasing investment in long-term solutions. Efforts must also be deployed to improve fertilizer use efficiency, for instance by investing in and using soil nutrient maps, and reduce dependency on mineral fertilizers. The Africa Fertilizer and Soil Health Summit will be key to set priority actions for the continent, and its outcomes should be supported with concrete actions. 5. Finance: Countries need to be provided with fiscal space to protect their populations from the impacts of the soaring food price inflation. Donor funding, concessional loans, and emergency relief through the IMF Food Shock Window are critical. A broader food import financing facility, such as that proposed by FAO, which will expand the IMF Food Shock Window, will ease the immediate food import financing burden of vulnerable countries and help them mitigate long-lasting impacts on their agrifood systems, reducing future needs for emergency assistance. While recommendations on debt relief and restructuring are beyond the scope of this report, there is no question that such actions would provide more fiscal space to offset the impact of elevated food, fuel and fertilizer prices on poor households. 6. Markets and trade: Governments must take concrete steps to improve the functioning and long-term resilience of global markets for food and agriculture, including by reducing distortions, improving competition and food safety standards, and – in the longer term – ensuring that the true costs of food and farmed goods are reflected when traded internationally. This also means strengthening the provision of public goods, for example by improving the availability of extension and advisory services, investing in research & development, promoting access to technologies and innovation, and improving infrastructure in rural areas. In the immediate future, AMIS should be provided with adequate support to enable it to monitor world fertilizer markets and assess global supply chain logistical constraints. Regional efforts should improve market data and analysis of commodities that contribute to the affordability of healthy diets. Governments should also enhance transparency on trade policies and measures affecting markets, exercise restraint in the use of export restrictions, and revitalize the WTO ongoing agriculture negotiations to address both short- and long-term food security challenges, while new financial tools to give policy-makers viable alternatives are also needed. 7. Agrifood systems transformation: We must address the underlying causes of hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition. The right investments now in transforming food systems to be more climate-resilient and less resource intensive will help to overcome the current crisis and build resilience to future crises – while responding to climate change challenges. To meet the targets of SDG 2 by 2030, agrifood systems must be transformed in ways that they deliver lower cost and safe nutritious foods that make healthy diets more affordable for all. To continue to drive poverty reduction and protect incomes and livelihoods in the face of future shocks, agrifood systems need to be more diverse, more climate-resilient and less resource intensive. Repurposing agricultural support would provide leverage to implement policies that will prompt the transformation of agrifood systems to become more sustainable and resilient and make healthy diets more affordable for all. |
[1] This chapter was prepared by the Chief Economist Office of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations – FAO.
[2] FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP & WHO. 2023. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2023. Repurposing food and agricultural policies to make healthy diets more affordable. Rome, FAO.
[3] Definitions and indicators related to hunger and food insecurity are provided in Box 1.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] FAO. 2022. Information Note: The importance of Ukraine and the Russian Federation for global agricultural markets and the risks associated with the war in Ukraine. 5 December 2022 update. Rome.
[7] Vos, R.; Glauber, J.; Hernandez, M., & Laborde, D. 2021. COVID-19 and Rising Global Food Prices: What’s Really Happening? IFPRI. Washington, DC.
[8] FAO. 2022. Information Note: The importance of Ukraine and the Russian Federation for global agricultural markets and the risks associated with the war in Ukraine. 5 December 2022 update. Rome.
[9] WTO. 2020. COVID-19 and Agriculture: A Story of Resilience. WTO Information Note, 26 August 2020. Geneva.
[10] Laborde, D. & Mamun, A. 2022. Food & Fertilizer Export Restrictions Tracker, IFPRI.
[11] FAO. 2022. Information Note: The importance of Ukraine and the Russian Federation for global agricultural markets and the risks associated with the war in Ukraine. 5 December 2022 update. Rome.
[12] WTO. 2022. The Crisis in Ukraine: Implications of the War for Global Trade and Development. WTO Secretariat Note, April 2022. Geneva.
[13] FAO & WTO. 2022. Global Fertilizer Markets and Policies: A Joint FAO/WTO Mapping Exercise. Rome and Geneva.
[14] FAO. 2022. Information Note: The importance of Ukraine and the Russian Federation for global agricultural markets and the risks associated with the war in Ukraine. 5 December 2022 update. Rome.
[15] WTO. 2023. One year of war in Ukraine: Assessing the impact on global trade and development. Geneva.
[16] WTO. 2023. One year of war in Ukraine: Assessing the impact on global trade and development. Geneva.
[17] This initial analysis was conducted using the Aglink-Cosimo modeling system developed by OECD and FAO. Updated estimates will be released in July 2023.
[18] See: https://news.un.org/pages/global-crisis-response-group/
[19] United Nations. 2022. Global Impact of war in Ukraine on food, energy and finance systems – Brief NO.1. New York.
[20] See: https://news.un.org/pages/global-crisis-response-group/#briefs
[21] Black Sea Grain Initiative. Memorandum of Understanding between the Russian Federation and the Secretariat of the United Nations.
[22] FAO. 2022. Information Note: The importance of Ukraine and the Russian Federation for global agricultural markets and the risks associated with the war in Ukraine. 5 December 2022 update. Rome.
[23] FAO. 2022. Global food import bill set to increase at a slower pace in 2022, nevertheless to another record level In: Food Outlook – Biannual Report on Global Food Markets. Food Outlook, November 2022. Rome
[24] FAO. 2022. A Global Food Import Financing Facility (FIFF): Responding to soaring food import costs and addressing the needs of the most exposed – Updated June 10th 2022. Rome.
[25] FAO. 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation – Quarterly Global Report No. 1, March 2023. Rome. https://doi.org/10.4060/cc4665en
[26] World Bank. 2023. Food Security Update, 12 January 2023.
[27] Food Security Cluster Dashboard. Accessed 15 March 2023.
[28] GNAFC & FSIN. 2022. Global Report on Food Crises 2022: Mid-Year Update. Rome. The 2023 edition of the Global Report on Food Crises is currently under preparation and expected to be published within end of April 2023 including the final 2022 AFI figures.
[29] WFP & FAO. 2022. Hunger Hotspots: FAO‐WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity. October 2022 to January 2023 Outlook. Rome.
[30] The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) and the Cadre Harmonisé provide transparent findings on current and projected acute food insecurity.
[31] GNAFC & FSIN. 2022. Report on Global Food Crises 2022: join analysis for better decisions. Rome.
[32] Somalia IPC Technical Working Group. 2023. Multi Partner Technical Release on Somalia 2022 Post Deyr Assessment and IPC Analysis Results. 28 February.
[33] According to the World Meteorological Organization, the likelihood of a return of the El Niño phenomenon increases as the year progresses, with a probability around of 55 percent from June 2023. WMO. 2023. WMO Update: El Niño may return. Press Release Number: 01032023, 1 March 2023.
[34] An update of the Hunger Hotspots report is due to be published in May 2023.
[35] GNAFC. 2022. 2022 Financing Flows and Food Crises Report – Analysis of humanitarian and development financing flows to food sectors in food crisis countries. Rome.
[36] An update to the report is forthcoming in May 2023.
[37] GNAFC. 2022. 2022 Financing Flows and Food Crises Report – Analysis of humanitarian and development financing flows to food sectors in food crisis countries. Rome.
[38] IPC. 2023. The IPC Renews its Strategy to Meet Global Demand for Actionable Information on Acute Food Insecurity and Malnutrition, Calls for Increased Funding. March.
[39] IPC. 2023. IPC Global Strategic Programme 2023-2026.
[40] Gentilini, U.; Almenfi, M.; Iyengar, H.; Valleriani, G.; Okamura, Y.; Urteaga, E. & Aziz, S. 2022. Tracking Global Social Protection Responses to Inflation. Living paper v.4, World Bank, Washington, DC.
[41] Rother, B.; Sosa, S.; Kohler, L.; Pierre, G. Kato, N.; Debbich, M.; Castrovillari, C.; Sharifzoda, K.; Van Heuvelen; E.; Machado, F.; Thevenot, C.; Mitra, P. & Fayad, D. 2022. Tackling the Global Food Crisis: Impact, Policy Response, and the Role of the IMF. IMF Note 2022/004. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
[42] UN GCRG. 2022. Global impact of war in Ukraine: Energy crisis.
[43] Group of 20. 2022. Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting Communiqué, 17-18 February 2022, Jakarta, Indonesia.
[44] See: World Bank, Debt Service Suspension Initiative.
[45] FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP & WHO. 2022. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2022. Repurposing food and agricultural policies to make healthy diets more affordable. Rome, FAO.
[46] FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP & WHO. 2022. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2022. Repurposing food and agricultural policies to make healthy diets more affordable. Rome, FAO.
[47] FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP & WHO. 2022. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2022. Repurposing food and agricultural policies to make healthy diets more affordable. Rome, FAO.
[48] FAO. 2023. FAO Brief on the interruption of the Black Sea Grain Initiative and its Potential Implications on Global Food Markets and Food Security.
[49] UNCTAD. 2023. A Trade Hope: The impact of the Black Sea Grain Initiative. Geneva.
[50] WTO. 2022. Ministerial Declaration on The Emergency Response to Food Insecurity. WT/MIN(22)/28; WT/L/1139. Geneva.
[51] WTO. 2022. World Trade Report 2022: Climate change and international trade. Geneva.
[52] Glauber, J.; Laborde, D. & Mamun, A. 2022. Food export restrictions have eased as the Russia-Ukraine war continues, but concerns remain for key commodities. IFPRI Blog Post, January 23, 2023.
[53] FAO & WTO. 2022. Global Fertilizer Markets and Policies: A Joint FAO/WTO Mapping Exercise. Rome and Geneva.
[54] FAO. 2022. Using Soil Maps to Promote Efficient Use of Fertilizers.
[55] See FAO and WTO. 2023. Global Fertilizer Markets and Policies. In this study Russia’s fertilizer exports are depicted by all other countries’ imports from the Russian Federation. Recourse to mirror statistics is necessary given the delay of export notifications by the Russian Federation. This mirroring may therefore underestimate the actual exports by the Russian Federation in recent months as imports by some of its trading partners, notably those of Belarus, are also not available. Other estimates put the decline in fertilizer exports from the Russian Federation at around 20 percent volume terms.
[56] According to the WTO, exports of primary sector goods (which include fuels, fertilizers and cereals) by the Russian Federation had a relatively small decline in volumes, while exports of other goods have fallen sharply. See: WTO. 2023. One Year of War in Ukraine: Assessing the impact on global trade and development. Geneva.
[57] Information on fertilizer access by country.
[58] For more information, see: https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2022/09/23/launch-of-the-save-crops-operation-initiative
[59] https://www.fao.org/3/cc2945en/cc2945en.pdf
[60] Glauber, J. & Laborde, D. 2022. How sanctions on Russia and Belarus are impacting exports of agricultural products and fertilizer. IFPRI, November 9, 2022. See also: US Department of Treasury. 2022. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Food Security Fact Sheet: Russia Sanctions and Agricultural Trade; EU Commission. 2023. Questions and Answers: tenth package of restrictive measures against Russia.
[61] See also: US Department of Treasury. 2022. Food Security Fact Sheet: Russia Sanctions and Agricultural Trade. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). European Commission. 2023. Questions and Answers: tenth package of restrictive measures against Russia.
[62] However, sanctions do affect trade in potash products from Belarus, and these sanctions predated February 2022.
[63] IMF. 2023. See: https://www.imf.org/en/news/searchnews#sort=%40imfdate%20descending
[64] For more information, see: Fertilizer Allocation Methodology; Fertilizer Allocation for Africa; and Trade tracker for Nitrogen, Phosphorous and Potassium fertilizer
[65] Malpass, D. 2022 A transformed fertilizer market is needed in response to the food crisis in Africa. World Bank Blogs, December 21, 2022.