1 Introduction[1]
After years of encouraging progress made toward reducing the number of undernourished people globally, in 2015 this trend began to stagnate and by 2018, undernourishment numbers began to rise. This trend was reinforced by the global COVID-19 pandemic, which led to an increase in hunger by 150 million since the outbreak of the pandemic. Supply shortages in international grain and vegetable oil markets, as a direct consequence of the Russian invasion and Ukraine’s inability to export, as well as high international food prices in the first half of 2022, have worsened the global food situation and likely contributed to global hunger increases.
With the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, international food prices rose sharply. The FAO Cereal Price Index has increased from 96 in 2019 to a record high of 141 in January 2022, while global prices for vegetable oil tripled over the same period (FAO 2023). A similar trend is observed for local food prices in low and middle-income countries (LMICs). Food price inflation has increased sharply in many regions since 2020. In Africa, average price changes for all food groups were over 10% in 2020. In 2021, price increases for most food items were slightly lower. In Asia, food price changes were slightly higher than in Africa, averaging about 50% for some products compared to 2019. The average price changes illustrate that local price spikes are not just exceptions but a general trend. However, the averages cover up extreme values. For example, cereal and tuber prices quadrupled between 2019 and 2021 in several markets in Syria and Lebanon. In several markets in Zambia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Ghana, prices for maize, cassava, or rice doubled (WFP 2023).
The escalation of the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine drove international wheat and maize prices up. Considering that Russia and Ukraine together account for about 20% of global maize exports and 30% of global wheat exports, effects are large. Additionally, the World Food Program typically stocks half of its grain reserves from Ukraine. Russia and its ally Belarus are also the top two exporters of fertilizer products. The importance of Ukraine and Russia for international commodity markets is reflected by this year’s movements of international wheat and maize prices (Fig. 1) which were strongly linked to changes in expectations about the future grain supply. For instance, within a few days after the outbreak of the war, the price of wheat rose from U$214/ton to about U$400/ton, the price of rice from U$441/ton climbed to about U$550/ton, and the price of maize rose from about U$150/ton to over U$300/ton at some point in 2021, as compared to pre-COVID levels (IGC 2023).
In the second half of 2022, international grain prices returned to the levels seen at the beginning of the year. This development was caused by the relaxation of international supply shortages through Ukrainian exports as part of the Black Sea Initiative and overland as well as the constant Russian export outflows. However, domestic food price inflation is still on the rise. Therefore, the global food crisis is far from over. The causes of international and domestic food price changes are complex and influenced by several interlinked factors. This study discusses the causes of rising and volatile food prices since the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, including the period of the Ukraine war, maps vulnerabilities, identifies development policies to prevent renewed price spikes and outlines support measures for LMICs to reduce the negative impact of high and volatile prices through economic and social policies.
2 Causes of post-Covid food price developments
Food markets cannot be analyzed in isolation. Interlinkages of agricultural markets with financial and energy markets as well as input markets continue to increase and contribute significantly to food price dynamics. This is further amplified by climate shocks. International food trade linkages have both negative and positive impacts on food security. On the one hand, trade reduces dependence on local weather patterns and plays an important role in improving global food security. However, the linkages also create potentially new vulnerabilities because different actors around the world, that are active in food markets, influence food prices through their trade and marketing decisions.
Generally, there exist different categories of causes for food price changes. The root causes are short-term and long-term changes in demand and supply. Due to the low price elasticity of demand for food products, supply changes often fully transmit into higher consumer prices. With the ongoing climate crisis, supply shocks due to extreme weather events become more frequent. Market conditions, such as the concentration of production and exports in a few countries and the lack of information and transparency about global food stocks, are the reason that individual supply shocks can destabilize the global food system. Often these shocks are amplified by internal causes such as discretionary trade policy measures (e.g., the export stops) or excessive speculation in agricultural commodity futures markets.
The increase in food, fertilizer, and energy prices began before the Russian invasion of Ukraine (Fig. 2). Price expectations and economic sanctions on Russia and its ally Belarus have created additional shortages in global fertilizer markets. Therefore, in assessing the effects of food price inflation, it is also important to consider macroeconomic developments during the Coronavirus period. Globally, economic growth rates were far below the forecasts. The Indian economy for instance shrank by 6% in 2020/2021 and in December 2021 employment was 2.9 million below the level in 2019/2020. Lower employment mainly affects women (Dev 2022). Given low or shrinking economic growth and reduced employment, which are also seen in other regions of the world, price increases in basic foodstuffs have even more serious effects on the socio-economic well-being of the population.
Supply chain disruptions contributed to the rise of input and output prices. Although global food trade appeared resilient during the Covid-19 pandemic (Engemann and Jafari 2022), market closures and restrictions on mobility under the Coronavirus protection measures caused additional costs for traders and the food-processing industry which contributed to price increases (Dietrich et al. 2021; Andriantomanga et al. 2023). In addition, unclear regulations and coordination failures between neighboring countries at the onset of the pandemic led to supply shortages due to long waiting times for customs clearance. Disruptions were not limited to output markets but also affected labor input and fertilizer availability. In India, where lockdown measures during the pandemic have been particularly severe, agricultural labor shortages, higher transportation costs, and the temporary closure of key wholesale markets hampered the smooth functioning of agricultural supply chains (Raijkhowa and Kornher 2022).
Increases in input and energy prices have led to increases in production costs and higher transportation costs (Fig. 2), which in turn have affected food prices. Since January 2021, prices of NPK (nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium), potassium, and phosphate rock have more than doubled, whereas prices of DAP (di-ammonium phosphate) and TSP (triple super-phosphate) have increased by 58% and 74%, respectively. The natural resources of all chemical fertilizer products are geographically concentrated. Russia, its ally Belarus, and China account for a significant share of global fertilizer exports (i.e., 50% of potassium and 30% of nitrogen). The potassium market is the most concentrated with over 60% of the reserve located in three countries in the northern hemisphere (Russia, Belarus, and Canada) (FAOSTAT 2023). The increase in fertilizer prices can be attributed to a combination of factors: Disruptions in the agricultural input supply chain, China’s restriction on the export of fertilizers up to and during 2022 (Laborde et al. 2022), as well as rising energy prices and the subsequent cuts in ammonia production. Labor shortages due to mobility restrictions as part of Covid-19 measures also contributed to the increase in production costs. All this led to an increase in the costs of global food supplies and thus higher prices. Russia and its ally Belarus also account for a significant share of global fertilizer exports. Supply chain disruption as a result of the military conflict in combination with export sanctions against Russia put additional pressure on energy and fertilizer prices (Glauber and Laborde, 2022).
Climate change and conflicts are the two other main drivers of domestic inflation. In 2022, extreme weather events destroyed harvests and livelihoods in several LMICs. Most notable in terms of the number of affected people and causalities were floods in Pakistan, Guatemala, Bangladesh, and Nigeria, as well as droughts in Ethiopia, Niger, and China (Guha-Sapir et al.). In East Africa, the desert locust infestation in 2020 and very low precipitation in the past rainy season caused local food shortages. Conflicts, which are strongly linked to climate change and economic opportunities, break supply chains and reduce the availability of inputs and income. Additionally, migration flows stress receiving countries that are often food insecure and constrained. Therefore, stable international food prices will reduce the pressure on import-dependent countries, but bringing down domestic inflation requires a more comprehensive food systems approach.
Food system geopolitics make the global food system less predictable. Unlike during the global food crises of 2007/2008 and 2011, global food supplies have been stable over the past two years. Global grain inventories were around 24% of total supply at the start of 2020, significantly higher than before the 2008 price crisis (18%), which means that short-term production shortfalls can, in principle, be absorbed unless political restrictions take effect. The ownership of these stocks has, however, shifted since 2008. Today, China is the largest food importer in the world and alone holds more than half of the global cereal stocks. Other food stocks remain highly concentrated in a few exporting countries, including India (USDA 2023). China and India are, however, not predictable due to public involvement in the management of food stocks. For instance, China’s agricultural policy is a major source of uncertainty, given its heavy dependence on imports of animal feed. President Xi Jinping warned against underestimating the risk of food shortages and underlined the importance of public actions to guarantee grain security linked to national security (MacDonald 2020). With increasing living standards, the same applies to the supply of meat and vegetables. Measured in terms of global food trade, an aggressive import strategy by China or reduced exports could lead to further turbulence and supply shortages on the world market.
3 Causes of a prolonged food crisis
3.1 International price movements
The causes of food price inflation are complex. The direct vulnerability to international food price shocks increases with a country’s food import dependency. Specifically, higher international prices translate directly into an increasing food import bill. For instance, besides many small states and islands (SSI), several countries around the world spend a large share of their export revenue on food imports.[2] In these countries, international food price shocks, amplified by local climate and economic shocks and conflicts, have led to significant increases in domestic food price inflation across local markets in LMICs and High-Income Countries (HICs). Domestic food price inflation usually responds to international price spikes with a time lag, dependent on a country’s integration into international supply chains. This is also indicative of the development of domestic food price inflation levels over the last 24 months. Food price inflation (nominal and real) was relatively stable during the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, started to increase in 2021, and has reached unprecedented levels since then without a slowdown in view. On the other hand, expansive monetary policies and overspending to provide an economic stimulus, in response to the economic downturn, have increased general inflationary pressure, which requires a different policy response than global food market failures (Algieri et al. 2023).
3.2 Fertilizer accessibility and availability
The consequence of increasing fertilizer prices on LMICs, especially in African countries, is not immediate, but reduced fertilizer use leads to lower yields and production in the coming years. Fertilizer prices are at record highs. The distribution of natural resources needed for chemical fertilizer makes local production difficult and increases import dependency. Limited local production is partly responsible for high fertilizer prices and low rates of adoption in many LMICs, particularly in Africa where the green revolution has been halted (Badiane et al. 2022). Due to the high level of fertilizer import dependency, domestic fertilizer prices also move alongside international prices, which also caused a significant increase in local fertilizer prices in Africa. For instance, the price of urea increased between January 2021 and the end of 2023 by around 60% in Kenya, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria and by 90% in Ghana. This will lead to reduced agricultural productivity and food supply in Africa because yields are more responsive to fertilizer application rates than in other regions. Fertilizer use and crop yields have grown in parallel over the past decades, but application rates in Africa have remained distinctly low, at about 20 kg per hectare, whereas Europe is at about 90 kg and Asia at about 180 kg (FAOSTAT 2023). The overuse of fertilizer in North America, Europe, and South Asia has created large nutrient surpluses associated with environmental pollution, contrasted with soil nutrient depletion in Africa (Dobberman et al. 2021). Due to these differences, agricultural yields and food production are much more responsive to fertilizer use in Africa than in other regions of the world (Table 1 and Figure 3).[3]
For African countries, it is expected that fertilizer usage for cereals could reduce by around 20%, which is equivalent to a reduction of around 4kg/ha at the current level of fertilizer consumption in Africa. Reduced fertilizer usage suggests a reduction in calories per ha by around 250,000. This is equivalent to 96 calories per person per day for Ethiopia and 115 calories per person per day for Uganda (derived from Table 1). Besides direct production effects, reduced fertilizer use is accompanied by general equilibrium/macroeconomic effects and subsequent lower agricultural output. This could lead to reductions in agricultural output by 3%-8% and overall GDP by 1%-3% annually for several African countries (Badiane et al. 2022). To make fertilizer more accessible and affordable for African countries, it is essential to both build resilient and sustainable global fertilizer markets, that take note of shortages in LMICs, and to increase efforts to build up private fertilizer markets in Africa (Malapas 2022).
Table 1: Relationship between fertilizer use (ton/ha) and cereal yields (mil. calories/ha)
Dependent variable cereal yields (mil. calories/ha) |
(1) OLS |
(2) OLS |
(3) OLS |
(4) OLS
|
(5) FE
|
Fertilizer variable |
Total fertilizer |
Total fertilizer |
Nitrogen |
Potassium |
Total fertilizer |
Fertilizer use per ha |
68.78*** (25.18) |
57.69*** (21.00) |
84.06*** (14.36) |
321.2*** (19.30) |
17.25*** (9.79) |
Fertilizer use per ha^2 |
-164.2*** (-9.81) |
-129.8*** (-7.90) |
-205.5*** (-3.95) |
-4091.5*** (-11.48) |
-18.54*** (-5.14) |
Fertilizer use per ha^3 |
185.3*** (6.96) |
151.8*** (5.87) |
293.0* (2.52) |
15005.3*** (8.31) |
|
Weather controls |
NO |
YES |
YES |
YES |
YES |
Time trend |
NO |
YES |
YES |
YES |
YES |
R^2 |
0.56 |
0.61 |
0.28 |
0.29 |
0.31 |
Note: t -statistics in parentheses* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Weather controls include rainfall and temperate levels and deviations from the long-term trend. R^2 for the FE regression is from within variation.
3.3 Economic slowdown and macroeconomic instability
The economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic on LMICs are unprecedented and many countries have not recovered. Global GDP declined by more than 3.7% in 2020. Employment in many LMICs, especially in the informal sector, dramatically decreased and remittances – an important factor for livelihoods and economic stability – sharply dropped by 25% in sub-Saharan Africa (Usman et al. 2022). The global food crisis will create significant additional fiscal and economic costs. The international community, particularly the international financial institutions, is asked to provide a supporting role in this, incl. humanitarian and financial assistance, as well as policy advice and capacity building (Rother et al. 2022).
These effects are mostly the result of domestic demand reductions as well as global spillovers through tourism and export losses. Data also suggests a strong decline in (foreign direct) investment by more than 50% in 2020 (Lakermann et al. 2020). For Africa, economic growth was more than 8% lower than it would have been without COVID-19 (UNECA 2020). Increased investments in social protection programs also added pressure to African economies and contributed to an overall fiscal deficit expansion of about 6.5%. However, in many LMICs the economic recovery from the COVID crisis is slow. In almost half of the global economies, growth rates lag behind pre-COVID levels (IMF 2023). The result of macroeconomic instability was expansive monetary policy and the use of fiscal stimuli to mitigate crisis effects. In consequence, the food crisis has turned into an inflation crisis in many countries worldwide. High inflation and the inability to service debts can cause domestic economic crises that further reduce incomes and endanger progress in the fight against global hunger and render mitigation policies (i.e., social protection responses) difficult.
4 Consequences of a prolonged crisis and vulnerabilities
Food price inflation is one of the main risk factors for the undernourished and those at risk of becoming food insecure. Price fluctuations primarily affect poor populations in LMICs and threaten the stability and reliability of the global food system. Higher staple food prices reduce the real income of poor consumers who spend a significant portion of their income on food. Price spikes force households to switch to cheaper and less preferred foods that contain fewer nutrients or are of lower quality (Matz et al. 2015, d’Souza and Joliffe 2014). A basic food plate for a healthy diet remains unaffordable for many poor households (Masters et al. 2021) and becomes even more expensive with rising food and fuel prices. Lower dietary quality is associated with increased levels of malnutrition, particularly among children. Low height at younger ages below five years is a key predictor of later in life health and economic outcomes (Hoddinott et al. 2013).
While there is substantial evidence that exposure to severe economic shocks during early childhood is associated with lower height and increased prevalence of stunting, up until today, there is still limited evidence on the longer-term nutrition effects of the global food and economic crisis of 2008. Comparing height-for-age z-scores of children exposed to the 2008 crisis in-utero (e.g. Figure 4 between the red bars) in a cohort study of 12 African countries to children of the same age cohort who did not grow up during the 2008 crisis, Kornher et al. (2023) find that the exposure to the crisis negatively affected child height by about 0.1 standard deviations. Usman et al. (2021) also show that food price spikes are associated with increased short-term child mortality in LMICs. These results prompt the urgency of policy actions.
Which countries are most vulnerable to the current food crisis? Unlike in 2008-2012, the ongoing food crisis is the outcome of multiple related factors. For this reason, we examine vulnerability as the combination of exposure to different risks. We consider import dependency to measure the exposure to international food price development, food price inflation for domestic factors, conflicts, economic downturns, and vulnerability to climate shocks. The methodology is outlined in Table 2. In total, 58 countries are exposed to at least three risk factors. Figure 5 maps those countries with a GDP per capita of less than 10,000 USD. Haiti is the only country that is exposed to all five risks. Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Jamaica, Lebanon, Libya, Sri Lanka, Mexico, Myanmar, Sudan, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, and Venezuela are exposed to four risks.
Table 2: Exposure to different types of risks
Indicator |
Import dependency |
Food price inflation |
Conflict |
Economic downturn |
Climate vulnerability |
Definition |
Imports of >500 calories per day per person |
Double-digit inflation in 2022 |
Listed on the 2022 World Bank list of Fragile and Conflict-Affected States |
2022 GDP<2019 GDP |
World Risk Index Exposure >1 |
No. of countries |
92 |
104 |
37 |
50 |
101 |
5 Conclusion and policy implications
Average food prices saw an unprecedented 15% increase toward the end of 2022 – and much higher levels in many countries. The increase in food, fertilizer, and energy prices began before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Price expectations and economic sanctions on Russia and its ally Belarus have created additional shortages in global fertilizer markets. Decreased fertilizer usage by 20% in Africa and in many other countries may cause significant production shortfalls, causing further threats to food security in some LMICs. The global economy still has not recovered from the economic decline during the COVID-19 pandemic. Public spending to mitigate the consequences of the pandemic increased short-term borrowing and indebtedness causing macroeconomic turbulences.
The international community and governments around the world were alarmed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The G7 has emphasized its commitment to the achievement of the SDGs, including food security, and launched the Global Alliance for Food Security in May 2022 to coordinate the fight against global hunger in the face of a looming crisis. This initiative has made additional emergency support available. Its longer-term effectiveness to make the international agri-food system more resilient needs to be seen. The international community was keen to avoid mistakes made during the 2008-2012 food crisis. The G7 and EU have urged the international community to keep food markets open and have engaged in finding solutions to enable Ukraine grain exports via land and alternative sea routes, after Ukraine’s Black Sea ports were blocked, and later through the Black Sea Grain Initiative. It is key to improve the short-functioning of the global food market to reduce the inflationary pressures from international food markets.
On the other hand, the G7 and several allies have imposed economic sanctions on Russia and Belarus. But while these sanctions did carve out food and fertilizer products, sanctions on the banking and insurance industry and individual firms have made trade more difficult and expensive. Furthermore, blocking Belarus from using Baltic Sea ports and the difficulty in insure Black Sea shipments from Russia had, at times, adverse side effects of economic sanctions. Due to the political tension between Russia on the one side and NATO on the other side, the political coordination to keep food and fertilizer markets open should be maintained at the G20 and UN levels. The Black Sea Grain Initiative, which has shipped 12 million tons of grain – about half to developing countries – since July 2022, sets an example and must be continued to ensure adequate supply in international markets.
International financial organizations, together with the role of Rome-based food agencies, the WTO, and the AMIS should be strengthened to increase market transparency, trade functioning, and policy coordination. This includes substantial emergency programs to increase fertilizer availability in LMICs, increase debt relief, food aid, and budget support to expand social protection, including scaling humanitarian actions in and around hunger-prone zones impacted by climate crises and conflicts. However, regional coordination on food and nutrition security is essential. Regional trade agreements and common multilateral strategic grain reserves could empower developing regions to become resilient to global market shocks (Kornher and Kalkuhl 2017).
Global food crises response and global food systems reform issues need to be added to the UN agenda and the ongoing follow-up to the UN Food Systems Summit 2021 (von Braun et al. 2023), in addition to national pathways of food systems transformations. Long-term responses need to address sustainable productivity growth, and sustainable land use, especially in low-income countries, with technologies and innovations (Chaichebelu et al. 2021). To increase agricultural productivity, the allocative efficiency of fertilizer usage needs to improve by increasing fertilizer availability in Africa through local production, increasing nutrient efficiency worldwide, and the expansion of sustainable soil and land use (Doberman et al. 2021). The latter is called for from a climate policy perspective in any case. Last, restructuring the global food system (without counteracting environmental and climate goals) is required. This includes disincentivizing the demand for bioenergy and meat in high-income countries to expand food production and availability.
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[1] The paper draws on Kornher, L. and J. von Braun. 2022. Higher and more volatile food prices – Complex implications of the Ukraine war and the Covid-19-pandemic (ZEF Policy Brief 38) and Kornher, L. and J. von Braun. 2023. The global food crisis will not be over when international prices are back to normal (ZEF Policy Brief 42).
[2] Several countries spend more than half of their export revenue on food imports (Bonilla Index>0.5). These countries are Haiti, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Nepal, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tajikistan, Somalia, and Yemen.
[3] The cubic relationship give the best statistical fit. In the fixed effects model, the quadratic relationship performs best.
[4] The graph is extracted from a cohort study.