Executive Summary
The protracted Syria crisis (so far, 12 years) has brought about catastrophic impacts on the Syrian community on different levels. Conflict continues to be the principal driver of humanitarian needs, with the civilian population in many parts of the country exposed to significant protection risks which threaten life, dignity and wellbeing on a daily basis. The scale, severity, and complexity of needs across Syria remain overwhelming, rendering a community that is highly dependent on the humanitarian aid. People continue to suffer from multiple and complex socioeconomic difficulties, weakened purchasing power, increased unemployment percentage, floods, drought, cholera and increased price of the fuel, water, and hygiene items all are drivers for food insecurity and exacerbating livelihood needs and eroding the resilience and recovery prospects for many families across the country. The combination of conflict, natural disasters (drought, floods, agriculture pests) and COVID-19, led to the depreciation of the Syrian economy. An estimated 15 million people need food and agriculture assistance. At least 12.1 million people are estimated to be food insecure, including all 2 million people living in camps who are deemed to be 100% food insecure, and 2.9 million people are estimated to be at risk of sliding into food insecurity. In total this constitutes over half of the Syrian population who need urgent lifesaving and life sustaining food, agriculture and livelihoods assistance, due to a convergence of vulnerabilities resulting from displacement, exposure to hostilities, and limited access to basic goods and services. This piece summarizes specific needs and gaps in the Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL) sector in Northwest Syria, and briefly outlines the strategy for implementing FSL programs in these locations.
1. Introduction
The Middle East Center of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2015) stated that before the conflict before the March 2011 uprising, Syria was the only country in the region that was self-sufficient in food production and especially in staple agricultural crops such as wheat and barley. It had even turned into a regional exporter before a major drought in 2008-2009 forced the country to import large quantities of wheat for the first time in many years. De Châtel (2014) reported that after only four years of devastating conflict, the country is turned into a net importer of wheat, with dwindling production of fruit and vegetables. Amidst a record increase in prices of more than 800% in the last two years alone, the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (EMHRM) estimates that around 90% of the Syrian population has been living below the poverty line.[2] Local currency depreciation and an increase in unemployment have exacerbated the situation by eroding the purchasing power of Syrians. In mid-2019, a basic food ration was estimated to cost at least 80 per cent of an unskilled worker’s monthly salary, and 50-80 per cent of a civil servant’s salary. Total economic loss was approximately $442 billion in 2018, and the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) lost around 65 per cent of its value compared with pre-conflict levels (WFP, 2022a). Moreover, Alkaddour (2022) mentioned that insecurity, lack of financial and physical access to a quality input, and depletion of the agriculture areas followed by low crops harvesting during 2021 season were the factors that affected people’s food security and resulted in a significant gap in supply and demand, mainly for wheat and forage crops. The impact of Syria’s crisis continues to hinder people’s ability to meet their immediate food needs and livelihoods, in a context marked by very complex drivers and contributing factors. This includes economic worsening and weakened local currency, soaring food and non-food prices, as well as drought-like conditions and severe agro-climatic fluctuations, water scarcity, and limited energy supply. In addition, food and agriculture commodity price increases, inflation, lack of purchasing power due to limited livelihoods and income sources and population movements have had an important economic impact. According to the whole of Syria Food Security Sector (2023), the food security situation in Syria has drastically deteriorated since last year and has been exacerbated by the February 2023 earthquake; three weeks after the earthquake, WFP noted food prices were high in affected areas, with bread in particular costing 20% more in Aleppo compared to last year. The 2023 HNO figures (published prior to the catastrophic February 2023 earthquakes) for Syria indicate that 15.3 million people in Syria (approximately 69.2% of the population) are in need, of which 18.7% are identified as being in extreme or catastrophic need (OCHA, 2023). The Earthquake also caused increased humanitarian needs in NWS due to loss of shelter and destruction of general infrastructure.
2. Previous Status of FSL Sector in Syria
The Middle East Center of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2015) stated that before the conflict, Syria was the only country in the MENA region that was self-sufficient in food production (wheat, barley, cotton, corn and sugar beet crops). The country’s well-developed farming system, agricultural extension services and a state-command economy that focused on wheat production as a strategic food commodity, led to a relative food security of Syria. Traditionally, about 60% of cultivated land in Syria was used to grow wheat, with production concentrated in north Syria (Ahmad, 2016). Furthermore, according to the crop and food security assessment in Syria that was conducted by FAO and WFP (2019), wheat production estimated at 4-4.7 million MT, essential seeds reserves were enough to cover the country’s consumption and seed security for at least 2-3 years. The government of Syria subsidizes all inputs, monopolizing most inputs (including seeds and fertilizers), is the sole buyer of wheat, controls all marketing channels and implements agricultural research to improve productivity. In 2010, the agriculture sector accounted for 18% of the country’s GDP and 23% of its exports, and it involved 17% of its labor force in production. Some 46% of Syrians were rural dwellers and, of those, about 80% were sustained by income from agricultural work. Prior to the conflict, the food needs of Syrians were primarily met through a combination of a household’s own production and purchases from the local markets through cash and credit.
The type of livestock pre- and post-crisis in Syria has not changed, with chickens listed as the most common livestock, sheep a clear second, and then a smaller number of goats and cows. There has been a clear reduction in the numbers of livestock kept since the conflict began. Women participate in most activities related to livestock production including milking, grazing, providing fodder, and manufacturing dairy products, whether for home consumption or for sale in the local market. Prior to the conflict, veterinary inputs were manufactured locally or imported. The quality of veterinary inputs was monitored by the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock through specialized laboratories to determine drug composition. All vaccines were imported by the Government of Syria (GoS) and were appropriate for diseases common in Syria. Pre-conflict, livestock breeders received support from the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock through periodic vaccination campaigns. A modest 50% of the fodder needed for livestock breeders was available at both good quality and affordable prices (FAO & WFP, 2019).
3. Current Status of FSL Sector in Syria
3.1. Food Assistance
In NWS, of the 1.8 million people living in IDP sites, 23% are women and 56% are children, according to the 2023 HNO. The food security situation in Syria has drastically deteriorated since last year with an estimated 15 million people in need of some form of food and agriculture assistance. This represents an increase of 7% when compared to last year’s number of 13.9 million and a 55% increase since 2019. Of those in need of food assistance, 59% are in extreme need, including all households in camps, which are 100% food insecure. High food prices and severe economic deterioration contribute to food insecurity across Syria. According to WFP (2022b),[3] the October 2022 standard reference for food basket was 52% dearer than seven months ago, the onset of the crisis in Ukraine, up 91% compared to a year earlier, reaching SYP 357,593 (USD 119 at the official exchange rate of SYP 3,015). Families have been simultaneously affected by a loss of income and purchasing power. By August 2022 the average household expenditure (855,499 SYP) exceeded average household income (533,514 SYP) by 60%, as compared with 49% in 2021. Moreover, the Joint Market Monitoring Initiative Dataset conducted by Cash Working Group in Northwest Syria found that in March 2023, the regional SMEB was recorded to be 1144,322 SYP (154 USD), which represents a +16 % increase for the SYP price since January 2023. The regional SMEB Food Component was recorded to be 840,005 SYP (113 USD), which represents an increase of +19% for the SYP price since January 2023. The informal USD/SYP exchange rate was recorded to be 7,450 SYP, which represents a +15% change since January 2023. The informal USD/TRY exchange rate was recorded to be 19.18 TRY, which represents a +1% change since January 2023.[4] To cope, many households now rely primarily on a mixture of purchases from the local market (predominantly on credit) and humanitarian assistance. In most areas of NWS, the author noticed that the use of negative coping strategies remained relatively high with 17% of these households having a high rCSI score, 56% medium and 27% low. Some of the negative coping strategies utilized included limiting portion size and restricting adult consumption, early marriage, and child labor. Moreover, according to WoS FSS and iMMAP Post-Earthquake Wheat-Flour to Bread Processing Facilities Mapping Study for Northwest Syria (2023),[5] 19% of bakeries were reported to be non-operational due to the lack of access to wheat/flour and high operational costs and the inability to compete with NGO-supported bakeries. The daily portion of produced bread per individual in NWS has decreased 4% compared to Q3 2022. In terms of accessibility, the access and affordability of bread remained a challenge for vulnerable people. This is due to the increased selling price of 1 kg of subsidized bread in NWS which increased by 14% and reached 4.89 TRY/kg compared to 4.5 TRY/kg in Q3 2022. Moreover, the average reported selling price of 1 kg of unsubsidized bread in NWS was 9.77 TRY/kg with an increase of 5% compared to Q3 2022 (8.66 TRY/kg). Further, the impact of the February 6, 2023 earthquake in Türkiye and Syria, resulted in an increase in bread price that WFP noted to be high in affected areas, with the price of bread 20% higher than last year in Aleppo.[6] The absence of locally produced and manufactured basic food supplies has influenced reliance on imports whose cost is beyond the reach of many vulnerable people.
The pre-decided transfer values for voucher support no longer have the same purchasing power as intended when designed. The market assessments used to inform these values are outdated with the rise of prices not only in TRY but also in USD. For instance, the restricted vouchers for fertilizers, seeds, etc. are no longer sufficient to buy the planned supplies from the markets given current prices. In 2022, the value voucher for food commodities updated from 60 USD to 78 USD per family of 6 members to meet the high prices of food commodities.[7] However, due to fund limitations it has decreased again to 65 USD, which could affect the FCS of vulnerable families bigger than 6 members.[8]
3.2. Agriculture Sector
Like all sectors of the Syrian Arab Republic’s economy, agriculture has suffered serious setbacks since the beginning of the current crisis in 2011. Insecurity, lack of financial and physical access to food, and depletion of livelihoods were the three factors that affected people’s food security. In particular, lack of financial and physical access to food is the result of lack of income, low purchasing power, fragmented markets, high prices and also the big drop in crops production. Agricultural production has experienced significant loss, particularly affecting rural farming and herding families. This is forcing people to migrate or to look for other sources of income. Wide areas of agricultural land with orchards or crops have been destroyed and farmers are facing shortages in the availability of agricultural inputs (seeds, fertilizers, fuel … etc.) or are unable to afford them due to soaring prices and big damage in infrastructure (irrigation structures, processing and storage facilities, private and public farming equipment and agro-sector buildings) and governmental services (extension, vaccine campaigns, loans, agricultural banks ... etc.). Some of the main challenges that the agriculture sector is subjected to are shown in (Figure 1).
During 2017, FAO estimated the overall financial cost of damage and loss in the agriculture sector over the 2011-2016 period to be at least 16 billion USD. The cost of damage to irrigation systems and other kinds of agricultural infrastructure, such as buildings, was also estimated at 3.2 billion USD.[9] The status of agriculture in Syria is closely linked to the food security of both host communities and displaced people across NWS. Gaps and shortfalls in agricultural production lead to higher levels of food insecurity as food prices increase, items face shortages, and reliance on imports increases. The conflict, as well as changes in weather patterns, has reduced wheat production to 1 million MT, 27% of the pre-crisis average of 3.6 million MT.[10] Wheat cultivation has followed an up and down pattern. The high prices of agriculture production inputs, especially fuel, fertilizers, pesticides etc., continues to limit agriculture input use by farmers and adherence to standard seed and chemicals dose rates. According to iMMAP Wheat Value Chain Assessment Study on Northwest Syria 2022, climate-induced aridity and water scarcity continue to affect Syria with below-average levels of rainfall in the 2021-2022 winter season, affecting wheat crop physiology and productivity. The study noted that wheat farmers encountered limitations in accessing chemical inputs like fertilizers and organic inputs. The study recorded an increase in fuel price, and the relative increased irrigation operational costs of pumping for water extraction was also reported as a major challenge for irrigated wheat crop production. Moreover, some farmers reportedly considered shifting from staple wheat to cash crop production, mainly due to the increased production cost of wheat, the lower production cost of cash crops, the lower needs of cash crops for irrigation, and the higher selling cost and profitability nature of cash crop production in NWS. iMMAP found that 23% of farmers intended to reduce the area of land cultivated by wheat crop during 2022-2023 season, largely due to the increased cost of agricultural inputs required for wheat production.[11] The decline in agricultural production output was not only limited to rainfed crops production systems but also to irrigated crops such as cereals, legumes, barley, and vegetables. Farmers reported that the highest contributors to wheat production costs are the use of chemical inputs, the use of machinery such as tractors and harvesters, and fuel. Wheat production output for the 2021-2022 agricultural seasons was less than 30% of the long-term average in Syria (HNO, 2023).
On the contrary, the low cost of cash crop production (cumin, anise, coriander, nigella seeds etc.), its less susceptibility to fire and its good harvest makes these crops compete with wheat production. Similarly, the production of traditional and essential crops (cotton and sugar beet) has disappeared too, and the replacement are again more profit-generating cash crops. However, crops production in this area is susceptible to severe ecological stresses during several growing seasons, i.e., frost or rainfall retention and high temperatures, frequent droughts and/or severe moisture stresses and outbreaks of pests and diseases. Crop production is also impacted by high labor costs, shortages of skilled workers, internal displacement, and fragmented markets, with disrupted supply chains. Since the start of the conflict, across the country, high costs for veterinary medicines drive households to engage in extensive destocking.[12] Domestic factories for manufacturing veterinary medicines and artificial insemination inputs in GoS-controlled areas have been destroyed or are out of service. The high prices of imported raw materials have also hampered domestic production of veterinary inputs. In NWS, the lack of stable transportation routes means that domestically produced veterinary inputs have been replaced with more expensive, imported products from Türkiye or Europe. Unfortunately, the absence of official governmental institutions to regulate imports has led to the sale of unreliable, low-quality, and counterfeit veterinary inputs in markets. Furthermore, Syria has experienced an increase in diseases affecting livestock. The most common endemic diseases encountered by households include Pasteurella and Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD). Post-crisis there has also been a rise in cases of smallpox. The prevalence of most diseases has increased by 7-8% since the start of the crisis. Livestock has also not been spared from the impact of the prevailing water shortage and scarcity, limited access to livestock production inputs, especially feed, and the generally unfavorable weather conditions (HNO, 2023). Seed supply has not yet been taken up by the local authorities and private seed companies and has thus been overlooked. The legal framework for a formal seed supply chain and certification scheme was implemented at a low level by the new established GOSM in North Syria due to financial limitations. This system is covering around 15% of the region’s need of certified seeds. The certification scheme is traditional and below standard due to the limitations in laboratories. As quality control and certification is weak, farmers are not very interested in paying higher prices for seed because they cannot be sure that they are getting the genuine product; also due to the limited extension services, farmers are not applying recommended improved agricultural practices. Furthermore, because of lack of adequate storage facilities, market inaccessibility, inadequate processing facilities, and consumers’ exploitation through inflated pricing, post-harvest losses are significant.
3.3. Other Shocks that Are Affecting FSL in NWS
3.3.1. Conflict
- Massive displacement as a result of the insecurity situation
- Direct airstrikes affecting markets, infrastructure, and people’s assists
- Shootings of farmers and agricultural workers
- Movement restrictions as a result of the internal fighting between the armed groups
- Lack of fuel and electricity cuts have also affected the water supply
- Lack of specialized staff (brain drain)
- Detonation of landmines, UXO and IEDs
- Crop destruction by fire: Between 2017 and 2022 there were at least 198 incidents where crops or farmland were set on fire. The vast majority (91%) of all incidents were recorded in the summer months of May and June when Syria’s key crop – wheat – is harvested. The conflict parties perpetrating these incidents varied across the country.[13]
3.3.2. Environmental Shocks
Together with several heatwaves, limited availability of irrigation water resulted in a contraction of the harvestable cereal area.
- Insufficient and poorly distributed rainfall (drought) led to complete harvest failure, as shown in (Figure 2)
- Late rain also leads to failure harvest of crops
- Floods and frost
- Crop disease because of poor-quality seed and inputs (rust, Sunn, leafhoppers, etc.)
- Farmers in several parts of the country drill new underground wells to irrigate farmland; pumping water from new wells is a problem with a trend in declining the regional water tables
- Dams and rivers are drying up.
3.3.3. Economic
- Sudden inflation of Syrian pound against foreign currencies
- Complete breakdown of government subsidies
- Breakdown of supply routes and sources of raw materials leading to closure of the big factories
- Border closures (regional and internal) from time to time
- Massive rise in prices of fuel and agricultural inputs
- Purchases of farmers outputs no longer guaranteed
- High unemployment status (people are dependent on food support from NGOs, charities, and UN agencies)
- Youths employed in war economy as a source of income
- Malnutrition cases as a result of hard coping strategies besides poor HHDD
- Fund cuts
- Limited duration of humanitarian programs.
3.3.4. Impact of COVID-19
The coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19) is the greatest existential threat to life in the last 100 years. For Syrians, the pandemic, while undeniably traumatic, is just one more event in a litany of equally devastating hardships that have proven inescapable, difficult, and necessary to endure. More than a decade of war and a collapsing economy have forced 6 million or more Syrians into crowded living conditions along the Syrian border, into neighboring countries and failed states with fragile and fragmented healthcare systems. Syria is ranked as one of the least prepared countries in the world for emergency disease outbreak preparedness and response. A curfew in some areas was initially put in place to encourage people to stay in their homes to reduce their risk of disease exposure and onward transmission. However, individuals still need to leave home to collect their income. Conditions are far worse for those who live in north Syrian camps, where inadequate access to basic medical, water and sanitation facilities is commonplace, and a single tent may shelter as many as 5-10 people. Although face masks and disinfection liquids may be available in some markets in north Syria, most people can’t buy them. Significant price increases in fuel and some shortages in basic goods, essential food items, and personal sterilization and protection items (such as face masks, hand sanitizers) have been reported across Syria. These factors, in combination with panic-buying, disrupted supply routes, reduced shop opening hours, reduced working hours, wages and household incomes and movement restrictions are likely deepening pre-existing vulnerabilities. Since the onset of the pandemic, border crossings between Türkiye and northwest Syria have been closed for individuals but remained open to humanitarian shipments and the minimum movement of NGO medical staff. Humanitarian actors providing cross-border food assistance also face operational delays due to new protection measures. In Türkiye (as well as in agricultural areas inside Syria), the most vulnerable in Syrian society are day laborers, who depend on daily wages to cover the basic needs for their family. For displaced Syrians with no financial safety net, staying at home immediately worsens food security for entire households. Small-scale farmers and migratory agricultural workers lose access to extension services, are hindered from working or hiring workers to help with the harvest.[14] Following the outbreak of COVID-19, the oil black market grew sharply. Oil movement from opposition to government-controlled zones was restricted. The official oil price subsidized for farmers’ use is SYP 180 per liter, while the price on the black market is SYP 350 per liter. Farmers, who receive only around 150 liters of subsidized oil per month, will therefore be reluctant to plant using irrigated systems owing to the high cost of production. Increases in oil and fertilizer prices, the two basic inputs for goods production (machinery, water pumping, nutrient supply), are expected to raise production costs by 40-50 per cent, which is not guaranteed to be followed by an increase in market prices because of Syrians’ eroding purchasing power and reduced demand.[15]
3.3.5. Impact of Ukraine War
The war in Ukraine has plunged global food and energy markets into turmoil, raising high food prices even further. These increases have an impact on markets in Syria, which limit people’s access to food. Simultaneously increased operational costs for FSS partners in Syria constrain their response at a time when people need it most. Ongoing price monitoring of commodities by WFP from 75 markets across all 14 governorates in Syria, indicate that food prices have risen after few weeks of the Ukrainian crisis. For example, the price of WFP’s standard reference food basket at governorate level during the second week of March 2022 was at its highest level since monitoring started in 2013. By the second week of March the national average price of WFP’s standard reference food basket was 18% higher than compared to its average price in February 2022 and 12% higher than the price during the first week of March.[16] Both the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) and the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) simultaneously increased bread prices and lowered the weight of bread bundles. This led to bread queues becoming longer in addition to surfacing reports of corruption relating to the sale of subsidized bread.[17] Moreover, the Turkish lira’s depreciation in March, reaching 14.81 TRY per USD, resulted in a further increase in bread prices and reduction in bundle weights, which was also further exacerbated by a reduction or cessation of Turkish food exportation, particularly locally produced wheat, and regulated the export of flour throughout 2022, leading to future increases in bread prices in NWS. Livestock fodder became increasingly unaffordable. Oilseeds and the cooking oil created from them were at risk of being inaccessible due to increased prices and reduced supply.
As funding levels off due to donor nations’ treasuries being stretched, and in the face of rising food costs, WFP has reduced rations for vulnerable populations in NWS, e.g., WFP reduced the transfer value of food vouchers under the cash-based transfer programs from 60 to 40 USD per family per month. Wheat price increased as both Ukraine and Russia are critical players in global wheat and maize markets, ranging among the top five exporters globally for both commodities. Together, the two countries supply 30 percent of wheat to global markets.
3.3.6. Impact of Türkiye-Syria Earthquake
Following the February 6th, 2023 earthquakes in Türkiye and Syria, communities in NWS have been pushed to the brink as the severity of humanitarian needs has deepened in affected areas. Although markets in affected areas of NWS have been shown to be largely resilient and open following the earthquakes, according to the recent REACH rapid assessment,[18] prices continue to trend higher than during the same period last year, according to the World Food Program (WFP’s) Syria markets update.[19] While staples like bread were noted to be 20% and 6% higher in Aleppo and Idleb, respectively, the report also noted that diesel, which factors into the prices of a wide range of commodities, was more than double its price from the previous year in affected NWS areas. The dire economic and labor market situation in Syria has been further compounded by the devastating earthquake. Five governorates have been particularly impacted, namely Aleppo, Idleb, Hama, Lattakia and Tartous. It is estimated that these governorates, combined, are home to 43.4 per cent of the total population in Syria. The resulting estimates suggest that, in the five affected governorates, some 170,000 workers were unemployed. This is the equivalent of 6.2 per cent of all employed persons pre-earthquake.[20] Moreover, as per FAO assessment 2023,[21] on average 35% of community-level agricultural structures were reported to have been damaged, with a range from 20 to 70% depending on the type of structure. The proportion of respondents reporting damages to roads is lower with around 20%, but the number of roads to be repaired may have significant impact for producers considering also increase in prices of fuel. Structures reported “Partial Damage” need in-depth structural assessment (structures may have to be demolished and rebuilt).
Critical Assumptions and Risks
- Access constraints remain one of the foremost challenges to humanitarian response in NWS
- Equality and equity in access to humanitarian assistance and basic services (especially for women) is still restricted through different administrative obstacles
- Difficulties and potential risks associated with staff security as a result of kidnapping and sometimes killing
- Resilience-building investments and programs aiming at reducing needs may continue being insufficiently resourced by stabilization and development fund
- Availability of quality agricultural, food items and prices
- Change in beneficiaries’ behaviour (sell, cashing the CVA …)
- Obstacles or high fees to transfer money to employees, beneficiaries, and suppliers
- Since Türkiye and Russia are among the main actors in the Syrian Conflict, international development about these two actors will have impacts on humanitarian activities:
- Potential economic deterioration in Türkiye (and thus in Syria) due to the dependency on Russian markets and tourism, with an increase in the inflation and poverty rates
- Increasing aggressive reactions against refugees in Türkiye due to deteriorating economic situation
- Increasing wheat, fuel, and other commodities prices, which may affect the availability of some items related to humanitarian aid in Syria
- Limitations to the Export/Import and shipments processes, which may affect delivery dates and response time
- Vendors may have concerns and hesitation regarding long-term commitment contracts
- With the economic deterioration and the increased poverty, it is expected that the beneficiaries base will increase notably, with an increased demand for humanitarian assistance.
Recommendations
Specific recommendations to address the humanitarian crisis include:
- Continue providing life-saving food assistance to vulnerable populations in all areas affected by the crisis
- Increase the availability of locally-produced foods and support local preparation and packaging and distribution of food items, wheat/flour inputs and facility rehabilitation, with a focus on gradual scale-down to support mills and bakeries’ transition to self-sufficiency
- Strengthening synergies with relief and development provides food/cash-based interventions where/when markets are functional and the feasibility is sound to support community or household self-help initiatives to rebuild, maintain and create assets to improve livelihoods and build resilience
- Improve the linkages between food assistance and livelihoods interventions to shift from assistance to self-reliance where feasible
- Given the disruption of the public sector and particularly the absence of any technical assistance to farmers, support can be provided to farmers’ cooperatives, associations and farmers groups, activation or creation of cooperatives and establishment of seed production systems focusing on local varieties
- Provision of training and technical assistance is also needed on low input techniques and appropriate use of inputs (especially fertilizers, water, and pesticides). This can be done in the form of training of trainers
- Provide capacity-building schemes, including training on mine risk reduction besides crop and animal production, protection, and marketing (post-harvest management, food processing and preservation, technology investment in agriculture sector, cost recovery, community ownership of infrastructure)
- Incorporate disaster risk reduction (DRR) and climate smart activities throughout the planned livelihoods interventions
- Provide alternative sources of energy to irrigate irrigated land, rather than using poor quality and expensive fuels
- Support the agricultural industry, which is often based on agricultural products such as seeds, vegetables and fruits processing and marketing
- Forest sector (to recover the cut trees) is also important to consider
- Skills development, with a specific focus on women and youth (possible areas include agriculture and farming, livestock care, poultry, honey production, food preservation, marketing & storage, and handicrafts)
- Raise awareness and provide support to the sustainable management of natural resources (e.g., canals, dams, land) by introducing low-cost techniques (e.g., biogas, water harvesting)
- Rehabilitation of productive infrastructure, including irrigation, veterinary, storage, mills, and bakeries ... etc.
- Build community capital, promote community dialogue, and gender equality (to complement relief interventions).
Acknowledgment
The author extends his thanks to Global Communities organization for their valuable assistance in developing this manuscript. Also, the acknowledgement is extended to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences team for hosting and facilitating the Food and Humanitarian Crises: Science and Policies for Prevention and Mitigation Workshop, held at Casina Pio IV, Vatican City, between 9-10 May 2023.
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[*] Senior Food Security and Livelihoods Technical Advisor at Global Communities; Prof. and Research Fellow, CARA & University of South Wales (USW), UK. Corresponding author: aalkaddour@globalcommunities.org; anaskadour1@yahoo.com; anas.alkaddour@southwales.ac.uk
[2] Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor. 2022. Syria: Unprecedented rise in poverty rate, significant shortfall in humanitarian aid funding.
[3] WFP Syria Market Price Watch Bulletin, October 2022b.
[4] Cash Working Group Northwest Syria Joint Market Monitoring Initiative (JMMI) Dataset: March 2023.
[5] WoS FSS and iMMAP. Post-Earthquake Wheat-Flour to Bread Processing Facilities Mapping Study for Northwest Syria. March 2023.
[6] WFP. Syria Markets Update 18-25 February 2023.
[7] Food Security Cluster, Early Recovery and Livelihoods Cluster and Cash Working Group. 2022. Information Note: Ukraine Crisis and its impacts on northwest Syria markets.
[8] Cash Working Group (NWS) and Food Security & Livelihoods Cluster, Syria Cross Border HLG. 2023. Cash and Voucher Assistance (CVA) Transfer Values Interim Guidance.
[9] FAO. 2017. Counting the Cost, Agriculture in Syria after six years of crisis.
[10] Syria sanctions inflict suffering as al-Assad regime marches on, Conflict News.
[11] iMAPP and Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster. Wheat Value Chain Assessment Northwest Syria. November 2022.
[12] OCHA. 2022. HNO Syrian Arab Republic.
[13] Insecurity Insight. 2023. The Links between Conflict and Hunger in Syria.
[14] Community-led responses to COVID-19 are a matter of urgency in Syria.
[15] COVID-19 and Displaced Syrians Livelihoods along the Turkish-Syrian Border. Corona Times Publishing.
[16] WoS FSS. 2022. Repercussions of Ukraine crisis on food security in Syria.
[17] Mercy Corps. 2022. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict and its food security implications in northwest Syria.
[18] REACH Earthquake Response Joint Rapid Assessment of Markets February 2023 NWS.
[19] WFP. Syria Markets Update 18-25 February 2023.
[20] ILO. Impact of the February 2023 Earthquakes on Employment and the Labour Market in Syria.
[21] FAO. 2023. Post-earthquake rapid needs assessment on agricultural livelihoods and production in the northwest.