Abstract
This paper focuses on the nexus between climate change and migration, identifying climate change as a significant driver of mass migrations due to its exacerbation of extreme weather events and environmental degradation.
We introduce the MAST framework – Mitigation, Adaptation, and Social Transformation – as a strategic approach to addressing the impacts of climate change on migration. We examine climate change as a threat multiplier, intersecting with socioeconomic, political, and demographic factors influencing migration flows. The study also examines the differential impacts of climate change on various populations, noting that vulnerable groups, women, children, and indigenous communities are disproportionately affected.
We argue for the need to view migration not merely as a crisis but as a potential contributor to sustainable development. We advocate for comprehensive policies that integrate climate adaptation and migration, emphasizing the importance of international cooperation and the development of robust support systems to enhance the resilience of at-risk communities. The paper calls for a global covenant to protect populations most vulnerable to climate-induced migration, urging a shift in perspective to recognize migration as a testament to human resilience and adaptability.
Migration is an ancient human adaptation. Viewed anthropologically, migration is written in our genome[2] and encoded in our bodies – in our bipedalism,[3] in our stereoscopic vision,[4] and our central nervous system. Migration has always been a defining feature of human resilience.[5] We are homo sapiens mobilis: modern humans are the children of migration.[6]
In this paper, we first address some broad features of current worldwide migration patterns. We then turn to some definitions and conceptual matters, especially addressing the nexus between climate change and migration. Thirdly, we draw on migration patterns in relation to climate and environmental risks and endeavor to assess the impacts of climate change on different populations and the role of MAST (Mitigation, Adaptation, Social Transformation) now and moving forward.
I. Migration Today
In the modern era, migrations are complex and multi-determined; they escape vulgar mechanistic models of causality. Migrations unfold in complex ecologies involving broad features of statecraft – sovereignty and managing borders, as well as demography, economy, and society. Furthermore, historical relationships, cultural affinities, political interests, and the environment itself continue to carve the pathways of the great human migrations in the new millennium (Suárez-Orozco, 2019).
All continents are involved in mass migrations – as areas of immigration, emigration, transit, and return – and often as all four at once. In the twenty-first Century, mass migration is the human face of globalization – the sounds, colors, and aromas of a miniaturized, interconnected, and ever-fragile world.
International migration has grown significantly since the turn of the millennium, reaching approximately 282 million in 2020 – after a previous high of 221 million in 2010 and 174 million in 2000 (McAuliffe, M. & Triandafyllidou, A. 2021).
The World Migration Report (2022) suggests the largest international migration corridors are in North America, Europe, and Asia. By the 2020s, the largest number of international migrants (well over 50 million) resided in the United States of America, followed by Germany (approximately 16 million), Saudi Arabia (almost 14 million), the Russian Federation (approximately 12 million), and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (over 9 million). India is the largest country of origin of international migrants (with approximately 18 million emigrants), followed by Mexico (12 million). Today women comprise slightly less than half of all international migrants (McAuliffe, M. & Triandafyllidou, A. 2021).
Over the last century, well-worn migration corridors connected historically linked countries of origin with specific destinations in new societies.[7] That is the story of Latin American migrations to the United States; Mediterranean, African, and Middle Eastern migrations into Northern Europe; Ukrainian and Uzbek migrations to Russia; and Indian, Bangladeshi, and Filipino migrations into East Asia and the Middle East.
Large-scale migration is not random: “Long-term data shows that international migration is not uniform across the world but is shaped by economic, geographic, demographic and other factors resulting in distinct migration patterns, such as migration ‘corridors’ developed over many years.” (IOM, 2022). At the proximate level, migration is a household strategy.[8] Distinct patterns of kinship, household, and social organization carve the pathways for worldwide migratory journeys. The fundamental unit of migration is the family – variously defined and structured by distinct, culturally coded legislative, economic, reproductive, and symbolic forms. At the distal level, migration is determined by labor markets, wage differentials, demographic imbalances, technological change, war and terror, the environment, and climate change.
II. The Climate Crisis
Climate change exacerbates the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events and environmental degradation. Observed climate impacts on human systems and ecosystems are multiple and disparate and are powerfully interconnected to mass migrations. The IPCC defines climate change as “a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g., by using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer.” (IPCC, 2018). Global warming will continue if immediate action is not taken to adapt to 1.5ºC and reduce emissions.
According to the Planetary Call to Action for Climate Change Resilience, “2023 was the hottest year on record, resulting in severe global impacts due to extreme weather events. By February 2024, ocean temperatures soared to levels never seen, continuing a pattern that persisted throughout the preceding year. Climate experts now forecast that the Earth is very likely to exceed the critical global warming threshold of 1.5°C by 2030 to 2035. We have a limited time frame to proactively prepare for and respond to the crisis rather than simply reacting to it.”
The climate crisis, its origins, and its impacts are not uniformly distributed. There are disparities between and within countries. The Planetary Call to Action identifies three distinct groups: the Top One billion who are contributing more than 50% of heat-trapping pollutants; the Middle Four billion, and the Bottom Three billion who contribute less than 10% yet suffered 75% of the losses. The 46 Least Developed Countries (LDCs), most of them in Africa, with 15% of the population of the world, contribute only 1% of the world’s CO2 emissions.[9] In contrast, the G20 group of countries are responsible for 80% of the world’s CO2 emissions.
III. What is Climate Migration?
Climate change, environmental degradation, and geophysical hazards increase morbidity and mortality, disrupt production, decrease agricultural yields, decimate livestock, and forcefully displace millions worldwide (Suárez-Orozco, 2019; McLeman, 2014). Extreme weather patterns and weather-related hazards – inter alia, rising temperatures, rising sea levels, floods, high-intensity cyclones, monsoons, hurricanes, heat waves, droughts, forest fires, as well as slow-onset environmental degradation such as soil erosion, deforestation, and degradation of natural resources, intersect with other drivers of mass migrations forcing millions to escape seeking shelter.
At the end of 2023, there were 7.7 million people internally displaced globally as a result of disasters such as storms, floods, wildfires, and earthquakes (IDMC, 2024). Numerous global policy frameworks – including the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015), the United Nations Summit for Refugees and Migrants (United Nations, 2016), and the Global Compact for Migration (United Nations, 2018) recognize climate change as a driver of mass migration. While climate change is recognized as a driver of migration, it does not operate in isolation. The interaction between climate change and migration is nuanced. As a threat multiplier, climate change intersects with a complex web of other factors, including socioeconomic conditions, wage differentials, demographic imbalances, and environmental degradation (McMichael, 2023). War and terror, yet another driver of mass migration, also intersects with climate change.[10] Migration is a complex dynamic system shaped by various push-pull factors.[11]
Climate change impacts are being felt globally, but certain regions and populations are particularly vulnerable to its effects, forcing them to migrate. As articulated in Planetary Protocol for Climate Change Resilience, “over 3.6 billion people live in areas highly susceptible to climate change. For them, extreme weather patterns are the new drivers of forced migrations. An average of 21.5 million people have been forcibly displaced by weather-related sudden-onset hazards each year since 2008. The World Bank’s Groundswell report estimates that climate change could force an additional 216 million people across six world regions to move within their countries or across borders by 2050. Over a billion people could be displaced globally by 2050” (PAS & PASS, 2024).
The areas most affected by climate change include seriatim, (1) small island nations – especially vulnerable to sea-level rise, coastal erosion, and extreme weather events; (2) Sub-Saharan Africa – droughts, heatwaves, with food insecurity leading to forced displacement, (3) South Asia – inter alia, facing water scarcity, glacial melt, and extreme weather events, impacting agriculture and livelihoods, (4) Arctic region – now warming at a faster rate than the global average, leading to melting ice, permafrost thaw, and disruptions to ecosystems and to Indigenous communities, (5) Low-lying coastal areas are at risk from sea-level rise, storm surges, and saltwater intrusion, impacting communities and infrastructure.[12]
Climate and environmental researchers from various scholarly and scientific disciplines are adding new voices and academic perspectives to the study of mass migration, a domain historically dominated by sociologists, labor economists, and anthropologists. Immigration as an area of scholarly inquiry is fertile ground for climate and environmental scientists to engage with a defining issue of our times, enter transdisciplinary conversations, and learn from but also contribute their unique craft to unexplored areas of scientific and humanistic importance.[13]
Environmental sciences and climate change scholars are adding new evidence linking climate change and mass migration. In the early 1990s, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) noted that millions of people would be displaced because of climate change via shoreline erosion, coastal flooding, and agricultural disruptions (IOM, 2007). By 1993, the UNHCR identified four dynamics of forced displacement in the State of the World’s Refugees political instability, economic pressure, environmental degradation, and ethnic conflict (UNHCR, 1993). The UNHCR noted that “[m]illions of people have been forced to leave their homes because the land on which they live has become uninhabitable or is no longer able to support them.” (UNHCR, 1993, p. 3). In sum, while the migration/climate change/environment nexus is not a new concern for scholars and international bodies, the rapidly accelerating climate crisis creates significant new pressures for mass migration.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM)[14] defines environmental migrants as “persons or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad” (IOM, 2007, p. 1). The IOM definition recognizes three critical characteristics of the phenomenon. First are those displaced by sudden natural disasters and those who choose to move because of slow onset deteriorating environmental conditions. Second, it differentiates between short-term and long-term migrants. And third, it distinguishes between internal and international migrants.
Yet the scholarly record suggests a need for more consensus and clarity in the definition of climate migration. Furthermore, climate migrants do not fit into international protection regimes (Nishimura, 2015).
Research using a broad range of methodologies, from field-work and empirical case studies to surveys and conceptual work, illuminates the complex relationships between climate change and the various migration flows it engenders (Perch-Nielsen et al., 2008; Kaczan & Orgill-Meyer, 2020). Researchers have examined how climate change contributes to sudden and slow-onset events that induce migration. Slow-onset changes, inter alia, rising temperatures, deforestation, land degradation, erosion, desertification, and rising sea levels in coastal areas occur gradually, and the research suggests they tend to trigger movement in search of stability. In contrast, sudden-onset events such as floods, hurricanes, cyclones, heatwaves, and wildfires[15] tend to generate displacement as an immediate adaptation (Nishimura, 2015). Other research suggests that slow-onset events are more likely to result in voluntary migration. In contrast, sudden-onset events will likely lead to involuntary, short-term, and shorter-distance migrations (Cattaneo et al., 2019).
Migration due to climate factors can be analytically distinguished into several types: 1) short-term migration, 2) long-term migration, 3) voluntary migration, 4) forced migration, and 5) internal and international migration. Scholars have examined extreme weather events that increase the likelihood of sudden, internal, and short-term movement. Other scholarly work examines slow-onset changes (e.g., sea level rise, land degradation) as a threat multiplier pushing populations to make permanent moves versus deciding to stay and adapt (Barrett, 2012; Koubi et al., 2016; Cattaneo et al., 2019).
Climate migration is likely internal and from rural to urban areas (Martin, 2010; Ahmed, 2018). International migration is costly, requiring significant investments in household resources (Beine & Parsons 2017). The lack of international recognition and protections for climate migrants creates further barriers to international migration as destination countries do not have asylum or resettlement systems to manage the admission of persons who cannot return home due to climate and environmental threats (Martin, 2010).
Most case studies use temperature and precipitation data, household surveys, and census data to examine climate-induced migration patterns. A consistent finding in the literature suggests that temperature changes significantly impact migration (Thiede et al., 2016; Gray & Wise, 2016). For example, in South America, the odds of inter-province migration increased by 3.4% for every month when temperatures were more than two standard deviations above the long-term average (Thiede et al., 2016). Similarly, temperature variability is more important for internal than international migration in Kenya, Uganda, and Burkina Faso (Gray & Wise, 2016). Other case studies find that higher temperatures increase migration rates to urban areas and to close destinations (Cattaneo & Peri, 2016).
Precipitation and changes in rainfall have inconsistent effects on migration (Gray & Wise, 2016; Kaczan & Orgill-Meyer 2020). For example, excessive rain in Senegal increased the decision to migrate (Nawrotzki & Bakhtsiyarava, 2017), and precipitation-related disasters preceded migration within Mexico (Khamis & Li, 2020). However, research studies found insignificant impacts of flooding on migration in rural Pakistan (Mueller et al., 2014) or on precipitation and migration in Burkina Faso (Gray & Wise, 2016). These empirical results are mixed and primarily context-specific (Cai et al., 2016). Significantly, researchers found that floods can also constrain the decision to migrate because they deplete household resources (Kaczan & Orgill-Meyer 2020).
Much empirical research on climate and migration comes from Africa, South America, and South Asia (Berlemann & Steinhardt, 2017). This scholarly corpus again suggests that the likelihood of migrating internally, to neighboring countries, or further away internationally will depend on various factors but very significantly on household income levels (Beine & Parsons 2017). Most studies find that rising temperatures in agriculture-dependent countries induce outmigration (Berlemann & Steinhardt, 2017). Although migration can take many forms, the causes of migration are also highly dependent on previous migration history, migration networks, and various economic, labor, political, demographic, and social factors at both the origin and destination points (Cattaneo et al., 2019). Migrants move where they have better chances of finding labor at better wages (Cattaneo & Peri, 2016, Koubi et al., 2016) and to places with lower climate vulnerability (Grecequet et al., 2017). A case study in Maldives concluded that when interviewees considered migration, they sought better living and labor conditions (Kelman et al., 2016). International migration unfolds when individuals and networks can afford to pay for the migration costs (Beine & Parsons, 2017).
The scholarly corpus offers disparate estimates of the number of migrants due to climate change. For example, Myers (2002) projected that 200 million people will migrate due to environmental changes by 2050. More recent research claims that an average of 21.5 million people have been forcibly displaced by weather-related sudden onset hazards each year since 2008. The World Bank’s Groundswell report estimates that climate change could force an additional 216 million people across six world regions to move within their countries or across borders by 2050. Others suggest that over a billion people could be displaced globally by 2050.[16]
The data suggest that climate and migration exist as complex dynamic systems. Climate-related migrations unfold in complex ways alongside other drivers of mass migration, such as socioeconomic and labor factors and political and demographic characteristics. The climate-induced effects on coastal flooding, reduced rainfall, heat waves, droughts, and water scarcity increase the incentive for people to migrate. However, household economics, political factors, governance, war, and terror also intersect in the decision to migrate (Black et al., 2011). Moreover, it is essential to move away from the discourse that migration threatens national security (Nishimura, 2015). As Adger et al. (2024) argue, migration can contribute to sustainable development when it does not exacerbate structural inequalities, creates synergies with elements of sustainable development, and enhances people’s well-being.
IV. Impacts of Climate Change on Different Migrant Populations
The current climate crisis is a planetary crisis; however, specific sectors of the population experience different impacts of climate change. Women, children, socially vulnerable people, indigenous populations, older adults, people with chronic medical conditions, people with disabilities, or outdoor workers are examples of groups who are most at risk and are more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change (USEPA, 2024). In fact, migrant populations also experience different climate-induced migration patterns.
a. Women and Children
As noted in The Planetary Call to Action, “Women and children are more vulnerable than men to the impacts of climate change since 70% of the people living in poverty ( about 1.3 billion) are women. Women have less access than men to resources that would help them to adapt to climate change. Women dominate the world’s food production (50-80 percent) but own less than 10% of the land. Home and childcare responsibilities prevent women from migrating when a disaster hits.” Internationally, there are slightly more men than women migrants. Researchers in the field of climate and migration have examined distinct patterns experienced by women and children on the move. In an early study, Findley (1994) found that 62% of the women and children migrating during the severe 1983-1985 drought in the Sahel were more likely to be circular, short-distance migrants. Women and children temporarily migrated, often joining extended family members in villages. Women were also encouraged to marry earlier, and children were sent to less impacted neighboring villages to study, resulting in reduced household size during stressful times. In contrast, adolescents and younger married men would migrate to cities for employment (Findley, 1994).
Carola Suárez-Orozco states in her chapter that children are particularly vulnerable to climate change because it can create or multiply pre-existing vulnerabilities, and there are important impacts on their future possibilities. C. Suárez-Orozco, in her research, identifies three groups of children considering the climate change effects: children directly affected by environmental devastation, children who migrate due to these climate-related disruptions, and children experiencing eco-anxiety. For those children, the impacts are diverse, such as physical health, increased exposure to violence and exploitation, educational disruptions, and mental health. C. Suárez-Orozco focuses on promoting resilience solutions, empowering children, and education initiatives to face the future of environmental challenges.
Ezra & Kiros (2001) argue that migration in Africa is often a significant demographic response to environmental stress and poverty – where seasonal migration is expected to supplement family income and respond to population pressure and famine. Soumya Swaminathan claims that the climate crisis is not “gender neutral.” She argues that women and girls are at higher risk of poverty, food insecurity, and violence as they migrate to safer locations. Moreover, agriculture is the most critical sector for women in low-and lower-middle-income countries. For anything that impacts their crops, women have to work harder to secure the same income, and girls often have to leave school to help their mothers manage the increased burden.
Gender differences in migration are also found in various studies in Africa (Ezra & Kiros, 2001; Henry et al., 2004; Gray & Mueller, 2012; Gray & Wise, 2016), South America (Gray, 2009), and Asia (Mueller et al., 2014; Koubi et al., 2016) including cases-studies where women are more likely to migrate than men (Ezra & Kiros, 2001; Gray & Wise, 2016). Women migration is more likely to occur locally or internally than internationally (Gray, 2009). Their duration and distances distinguish men’s migration, since men are more likely to opt for long distances (Gray & Mueller, 2012) or move permanently to another village in the region if the environmental situation is favorable (Schoumaker & Beauchemin, 2004). Community characteristics (Ezra & Kiros, 2001) and gender differences (Henry et al., 2004) have a role in the decision to migrate. For example, males generally move for economic reasons (Henry et al., 2004) and to supplement household income (Gray & Mueller, 2012). In contrast, women move for family reasons (Henry et al., 2004) and a desire for better facilities, such as healthcare and schools (Kelman et al., 2019).
b. Age
The research on age as a characteristic of migration highlights the impact of various age-related factors in the migration process. Studies show that young adults and families are more inclined to migrate, influenced by opportunities for better livelihoods and family reunification. This trend is particularly pronounced when permanent migration decisions involve following other family members who have previously migrated (Gray, 2009; Koubi et al., 2016).
Moreover, age influences migration differently across regions and contexts. For instance, in rural Ethiopia, migration tends to peak at ages 30-40 for men and 25-29 for women, while in South Africa, significant internal migration is most likely to occur between ages 15-30 (Gray & Mueller, 2012; Mastrorillo et al., 2016). These patterns reflect a complex interplay of socio-economic factors, local demographics, and life stages shaping the migration dynamics in various settings.
The broader field of migration studies has evolved to include a wide range of topics, with significant contributions from disciplines like sociology, economics, and geography. The field now acknowledges the multifaceted nature of migration, influenced not only by economic factors but also by social networks, family dynamics, and broader structural conditions (King and Skeldon, 2010; Portes, 1997). This enriched understanding helps to grasp the nuanced ways in which age and other demographic factors shape migration patterns, further supporting the development of targeted policies and interventions.
c. Education
Various studies analyze the effect of education on environmental migration decision-making. People with higher education levels are more likely to migrate and migrate internationally (Drabo & Mbaye, 2015; Koubi et al., 2016). The research notes that highly educated people can assume the cost of international migration (Drabo & Mbaye, 2015) and look for better professional opportunities in another location (Koubi et al., 2016). Folks with lower levels of education are more vulnerable to the impacts of climate-induced environmental change yet opt to migrate internally or to neighboring countries (Drabo & Mbaye, 2015). Income levels also reveal significant differences in the decision to migrate. Weather-induced migration is generally more frequent among wealthier than poorer individuals (Kaczan & Orgill-Meyer, 2020). Generally having more options, higher-income migrants usually opt for international migration since they can afford the cost of migration (Mastrorillo et al., 2016). In contrast, lower-income folks who cannot afford migration as an option are less likely to move (Koubi et al., 2016). When they do, they opt for internal migration as an adaptation strategy (Mastrorillo et al., 2016).
d. Trapped Populations
Numerous case studies in the research literature shed light on the relationship between climate-induced environmental factors and migrating decisions. However, there are situations of voluntary immobility or choosing to stay in place due to attachment and sociocultural reasons versus trapped populations – who do not have the resources or networks that enable migration – who remain in areas of extreme climate risk (Gray & Wise, 2016; McMichael, 2020). A research study in Zambia (Nawrotzki et al. 2018) reveals that individuals in wealthy districts are more likely to migrate than poor districts, characterized by climate-related immobility. Access to networks also enables climate-related mobility.
Although trapped populations have received less attention in studies and policy, they will continue to experience the effects of climate and environmental changes, such as coastal and environmental degradation, water scarcity, and extreme weather events.[17] Many who will stay in situ must endeavor to adapt to environmental threats, unable to opt for the uncertainty and cost of migration (McMichael, 2023).
There are many reasons why people prefer to stay in their homes or livelihoods, including personal wealth, social connections, cultural norms, and government policy (Zickgraf, 2023). Nawrotzki et al. (2018) suggest that planners and policymakers need to recognize places that can trap populations and develop programs to support in situ adaptation because immobility may lead to cycles of poverty, vulnerability, and exposure to adverse climate impacts. Moreover, they also need to anticipate and prevent situations that can lead to humanitarian emergencies under climate change.
V. Climate Migration in the Context of Adaptation
Migration is often seen as a strategy to adapt to the environmental challenges posed by climate change. A critical debate in the research literature centers on whether migration should be viewed as an adaptive response or a failure to adapt to climate change. According to Kelman and Næss (2019), migration can be a voluntary method to address climate change and an indication that climate change has not been adequately managed, leading to forced migration. This occurs alongside various other factors that influence migration. Whether migration is voluntary or involuntary, it serves as a survival strategy to reduce vulnerability to environmental changes, maintain livelihoods, and enhance individuals’ ability to cope with the adverse effects of climate change.
Numerous studies emphasize the need to fund proven adaptation strategies to enhance resilience against climate change-induced migration (Black et al., 2011). Necessities include clean water and air, sustainable food, and energy sources. Effective adaptation strategies include adopting agricultural innovations and efficiency, nature-based solutions, investing in relevant technologies, formulating policies to boost resilience, and improving water supply systems (Martin, 2010; Cattaneo et al., 2019). These strategies are vital for mitigating environmental degradation and strengthening the resilience of vulnerable populations – such as the poor, children, women, the elderly, and Indigenous communities – to the impacts of climate change.
Advancing proven climate change adaptation policies is crucial to reducing vulnerabilities and protecting public health (McMichael, 2023). The ability to respond to climate change and manage its inevitable risks depends on various factors, including financial resources, governance, risk assessments, social resources, infrastructure, and technology (Barnett & Webber, 2010). Effective governance requires collaboration among government and non-governmental organizations to address these challenges. Additionally, forming multi-stakeholder and cross-disciplinary partnerships is necessary to develop initiatives that enhance climate resilience, support mitigation and adaptation efforts, and prevent forced migrations. When migration is preferred, then policies must focus on assisting and protecting people throughout the migration process, facilitating the planning, the journey, and the settlement process.
Here we present some policy recommendations in the context of migration and climate change to build solutions and knowledge for resilient people and resilient ecosystems:
1. Invest in climate adaptation and mitigation strategies: Governments and international donors must prioritize their policy agendas, budgets, and regulations to reduce the emissions of heat-trapping pollutants and invest in resilience planning. Moreover, governments should incorporate grants for community organizations to develop projects that support and advance the achievement of these objectives. Federal funding must be ensured for regions and municipalities for climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies, as well as sudden-onset climate-induced events.
2. Collaborative decision-making: Engagement between national, regional, and local levels of government, international organizations, NGOs, civil society, community organizations, indigenous groups, academia, the private sector, and key stakeholders is needed in the discussion of risks and identification of adaptation strategies and priorities.
3. Incorporation of local knowledge and local realities: The discussion of climate adaptation strategies in each country, region, or municipality should evaluate and incorporate the risks to vulnerable populations, infrastructure, and economy. Contextualized policy responses must incorporate local and indigenous knowledge and the needs of affected communities and migrants.
4. Evaluation of strategies: Governments need to incorporate evaluation processes, in collaboration with stakeholders, of the strategy to ensure that the policy addresses the problem and evaluates its implementation.
5. Consider climate change as a cross-cutting issue for the whole government: It is essential to recognize the interconnected dynamics of climate change. Governments and stakeholders have a crucial role in developing knowledge and programs that advance the understanding of how climate change impacts human health, equity, housing, migration, and the economic impacts of climate change.
6. Ensure in-situ adaptation programs in countries and regions most impacted by climate change and forced migration: Donor countries, international entities, and philanthropy must identify and fund adaptation projects in areas at risk to increase the resilience of the population, such as building safe water and air capacity, green energy, local and improved agriculture techniques, or improving access to education, among others. These projects must incorporate local stakeholders in the decision-making process. Although the decision to migrate will not depend exclusively on adopting said interventions, they can reduce forced migrations in areas where the impacts of climate change disproportionately contribute to displacement.
7. Develop programs for sudden-onset events or shocks (e.g., floods, hurricanes, cyclones, heatwaves, wildfires).[18] Climate change will impact these events more frequently and intensify droughts, flooding, coastal hazards, etc. Preparedness for these events can help reduce risk, protect human lives, and support emergency response systems and teams to respond and protect affected communities immediately.
8. Identify and support the different migration phases as an adaptation strategy: Pre-journey, journey, reception, integration, and potential return. Governments, the international community, and stakeholders can support the different phases of the migration journey, identify the benefits and risks of migration as a climate adaptation strategy, and contribute to viewing migration as an adaptation and development rather than a failure or a threat.
9. When people decide to migrate, it is necessary to focus on humanitarian needs as well as the demographic imbalances between high- and low-income countries and ongoing needs for labor migration. The Expert Council on Integration and Migration Annual Report (2023) proposes a combination of three instruments that countries could implement: the climate passport, the climate card, and the climate work visa.[19] Since climate change is one of the most significant challenges faced by humanity, there is still too little consideration of the potential migration and refugee policy responses in this context, the political and legal responses to climate-induced migration, and the humanitarian needs of people.
10. Take an all-of-humanity approach. Climate change will continue exacerbating these existing inequities for present and future generations if we do not take a-whole-of-humanity response. Political leadership is essential for climate adaptation and not ignoring the challenge. It is crucial to invest in measures to protect children and their right to protection, education, healthcare, or good nutrition. In the case of trapped populations, it is essential to give them protection, security, and dignity since they are situated in areas of grave risk.
11. Develop research, information, and better data systems on climate migration: One of the main challenges in the policy arena and research is quantifying climate-induced environmental migration. It is essential to continue developing research knowledge with case studies to identify the root causes of climate migration, the impacts and patterns of migration, and the different governmental strategies. Moreover, it is also crucial to develop databases and surveys to study how slow-onset events and sudden-onset events affect population displacements in disparate contexts. Federal agencies should develop knowledge and awareness in the context of climate change and provide information, technical assistance, and recommendations for state and local governments.
12. Recognition of climate-induced environmental migrants: The scholarly literature identifies one significant challenge: the lack of official recognition from governments or international agencies of environmental migrants and refugees. While the IOM defines environmental migrants, it is essential to continue working to recognize them in international law and policy discussions.
We urgently call for a framework integrating Mitigation, Adaptation, and Societal Transformation (MAST) to address climate change and migration, as current protections for climate-change migrants are insufficient. The existing systems for safeguarding migrants and refugees are outdated and ill-suited for the challenges of climate change and environmental instability. The flaws in the current system are self-evident. Post-World War II policies, developed by the United States and its allies, assumed that the causes of displacement would eventually be resolved, allowing for temporary promises of non-refoulement, or the right not to be returned to danger (Suárez-Orozco and Suro, 2017). However, these frameworks are misaligned with current realities, as climate-degraded environments often offer no hope of safe return.
A new approach is necessary to address climate change-induced migrations. Without immediate action, the 3.6 billion people living in areas highly vulnerable to climate change will continue to face escalating environmental risks. The current status quo, characterized by zones of entrapment and forced migrations, endangers millions. A new global covenant is needed to protect the most vulnerable populations from a climate crisis they did not create.
Migration is a fundamental aspect of the human condition, rooted in our evolutionary history and adaptability. Modern migration patterns are closely linked to the environmental challenges of climate change, highlighting the need for comprehensive strategies. MAST exemplifies the approaches required today. By viewing migration through the lenses of our biological and social imperatives alongside the demands of climate adaptation, we can recognize its role as part of broader social transformations. Viewing climate migrants as threats to national security is akin to viewing humanity itself as a threat. Migration is a testament to human resilience and adaptability.
The relationship between human mobility and climate change presents challenges and opportunities for global policy. When climate change directly affects human security, protecting individuals and communities from disruptions and threats to their well-being becomes imperative. Whether people choose to migrate or not, the core of the debate must focus on the protection, dignity, and security of those affected by climate change. As we explore the impacts of climate change on migration, policies must evolve to support and manage migration, leveraging its potential benefits while mitigating risks. Implementing MAST strategies effectively will require cross-border and interdisciplinary collaboration, fostering resilience and empowering at-risk communities.
We must confront the reality that regions most vulnerable to climate impacts are already experiencing the beginnings of more significant waves of forced migration. Data suggests that hundreds of millions may be displaced by mid-century. To address this, we must enhance the resilience of vulnerable communities and strengthen international cooperation and commitment. Only through a coordinated approach, with robust support systems and proactive planning, can we effectively manage the challenges of climate-driven migration, ensuring safety and dignity for all affected populations.
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[1] MAST – Mitigation, Adaptation, and Societal Transformation.
[2]> Genetics provides compelling evidence of ancient human migration patterns. The pioneering work of PAS former member Cavalli-Sforza compiles genetic data illustrating the extensive migrations that shaped the genetic diversity of modern humans, (Cavalli-Sforza, L.L., Menozzi, P., & Piazza, A., 1994. “The History and Geography of Human Genes.” Princeton University Press). For more recent studies, see https://phys.org/news/2023-07-ancient-dna-reveals-earliest-evidence.html; for a recent study of migration out of Africa, see https://scitechdaily.com/new-dna-research-changes-origin-of-human-species/
[3] Bipedalism offered early humans advantages in mobility and energy efficiency over long distances, which were crucial for migration and exploring new territories. See, Pontzer, H. (2012). “Energy expenditure in humans and other primates: a new synthesis.” Annual Review of Anthropology, 41, 25-40.
[4] The development of stereoscopic vision in humans is linked to the need to navigate complex environments. Stereoscopic vision provides depth perception, which would have been advantageous in varied and new terrains encountered during migrations. See, Howard, I.P., & Rogers, B.J. (1995). “Binocular Vision and Stereopsis.” Oxford University Press.
[5] We adhere to the IPCC-AR6 (2023) definition of resilience “as the capacity of social, economic, and environmental systems to cope with a hazardous event, trend, or disturbance, responding or reorganizing in ways that maintain their essential function, identity, and structure while also maintaining the capacity for adaptation, learning, and transformation.”
[6] Indeed, “the course of human history has been marked by complex patterns of migration, isolation, and admixture, the latter a term that refers to gene flow between individuals from different populations.” (McGrath, 2023) See https://phys.org/news/2023-05-human-ancestry-alleles.html
[7] Today’s well-worn migration corridors have older origins in the age of European exploration and conquest. “The colonization of territories ignited the first wave of globalization. European sea captains began regular transoceanic travel in the 15th and 16th Centuries for the first time, systematically connecting lands and peoples that had been unconnected. The peoples subjected to the processes of colonial domination endured cultural, social, political, and economic mutations, mostly as a consequence of acts of war and terror, genocide, and demographic collapse. Forced labor, slavery, territorial displacement, and the appropriation of natural resources were commonplace. War and conquest destroyed civilizations, induced demographic collapse, and caused massive displacement of indigenous populations and their livelihood. The expanding European powers systematically linked the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans, creating the largest trading systems ever seen in history. The trade routes became the great corridors for global migration during the last five centuries.” Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, 2023. See https://www.pass.va/en/events/2023/colonization.html
[8] “International migration is a commonly used strategy through which household members seek to accumulate resources, mitigate financial uncertainty, and provide better opportunities for their families” (Wassink and Viera, 2021). See also Garip, F. (2016). On the move: Changing mechanisms of Mexico-U.S. Migration. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
[9] Dr. Wilber K. Ottichilo, Governor of Vihiga County, Kenya, notes that Kenya suffers some of the most from the adverse climate change impacts causing human suffering and economic consequences impacting some 3 to 5% of their GDP annually. Punishingly, those who contribute the least to climate change, also suffer from inadequate health care systems. Economic loses means there is less public spending on health, education, or social protections to respond to climate shocks.
[10] The war in Syria embodies the synergies among climate change, war and terror, and mass human displacement. The Syrian war has led to a massive displacement crisis, with significant portions of the population being forced from their homes. As of the current year, over 12 million Syrians have been forcibly displaced within the region, marking the Syria crisis as the largest displacement crisis in the world. This figure includes 5.2 million refugees and asylum-seekers in neighboring countries (including Turkey) and 6.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Syria itself (https://reporting.unhcr.org/operational/situations/syria-situation). Syria’s drought is the most severe in nine hundred years. According to NASA data, it is “the driest on record.” NASA scientists found that “estimating uncertainties using a resampling approach [they could] conclude that there is an 89 percent likelihood that this drought is drier than any comparable period of the last 900 years and a 98 percent likelihood that it is drier than the last 500 years” (Cook et al. 2016, 1). According to UN data, the drought caused “75 percent of Syria’s farms to fail and 85 percent of livestock to die between 2006 and 2011. The collapse in crop yields forced as many as 1.5 million Syrians to migrate to urban centers like Homs and Damascus” (Stokes 2016, 2).
[11] People and families are forced to abandon their homes due to different interconnected factors where climate change is a threat multiplier. Climate change impacts (sea-level rise, and more frequent and intense drought, flooding and extreme weather events) intersect with other socioeconomic, political, demographic, and environmental factors, and it is expected that climate change will amplify the scale of human migration (McMichael, 2023).
[12] According to the Global Report on Internal Displacement, by 2017, most new displacements occurred in “low and lower-middle income countries and as a result of large-scale weather events, and predominantly in South and East Asia. While China, the Philippines, and India have the highest absolute numbers, small island states suffer disproportionally once population size is taken into account. Slow-onset disasters, existing vulnerabilities and conflict also continue to converge into explosive tipping points for displacement” (Global Report on Internal Displacement 2017, 10).
[13] Examples of such scholarship include Black et al. (2011) who developed a conceptual framework to study the factors and drivers of migration in the context of climate change. Their model identifies five different drivers of migration (social, environmental, political, economic, and demographic), the personal and household characteristics (age, sex, education, wealth, marital status, ethnicity, religion, and language), and the intervening obstacles and facilitators (political/legal framework, cost of moving, social networks, diasporic links, recruitment agencies, technology) that influence the decision of a family to migrate. Kelman (2015) proposes a decision-making flowchart summarizing the decisions that most often need to be taken. The flowchart provides a conceptual framework for migration-decision making and articulates the challenges facing those who decide to migrate.
[14] The IOM Glossary on Migration (2019) contributes to the consolidation of terminology and language concerning migration according to international law and standards. The glossary includes definitions of internal migration as “the movement of people within a State involving the establishment of a new temporary or permanent residence”; or international migration as “the movement of persons away from their place of usual residence and across an international border to a country of which they are not nationals”. The Glossary includes new terms such as “environmental migration”, “climate migration”, or “disaster displacement” to describe the movement of a person or a group of persons who are obligated to leave their habitual place of residence temporarily or permanently for reasons of progressive or sudden changes in the environment. The term has been used to draw attention to this phenomenon despite the lack of international protection
[15] As well as volcanic eruptions and earthquakes.
[16] Because migration is highly context-specific, the data suggests differing regional estimates moving forward, see the Groundswell report. Another World Bank study estimates that 140 million people in the South of the Sahara, South Asia, and Latin America will be displaced within their own countries to escape the slow-onset impacts of climate change and if urgent measures are not taken to fight against climate change (Rigaud et al., 2018).
[17] International actors often must provide support to trapped populations – providing existential resources for people in places where they are not able to move (Silchenko & Murray, 2023). This assistance is often the only option for people located in more vulnerable countries and regions to cope with and alleviate the economic impact of natural disasters or extreme weather events (Cattaneo et.al., 2016; Silchenko & Murray, 2023).
[18] Also, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and another catastrophic events.
[19] The SRV Annual Report (2023), proposes a combination of three instruments as national measures to climate change and migration. The SRV makes the recommendations to Germany and acknowledges that these can also be transferable to other political levels and countries. The first instrument, the Climate Passport, is proposed when the country of origin is uninhabitable and migration is the only option. The second instrument, the Climate Card, refers to offering limited residence to people whose country of origin is affected by the consequences of climate change with massive destruction in the country of origin leading to temporary migration. This card is temporary and limits the right to remain. The third instrument, the Climate Work Visa, is for countries that are affected by climate change but in a lesser extent than the previous ones, but still face gradual environmental changes that impact the quality of life in country of origin. The residence permit is conditional upon employment contract.