

## Towards a Nuclear-Free World: More than a Noble Utopia

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The five-year review of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is approaching: its steep goal is the promotion of a world finally free of the ominous threat of atomic bombs, which has loomed over it since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 that precipitated the end of the Second World War. Is this almost universal desire of the inhabitants of planet Earth more than a noble utopia?

The Spanish poet Francisco de Quevedo (1580-1645) defined *utopia* by pointing out that it means “no such place”. His brief description corresponds exactly to the etymological root of the word “utopia”, from the Greek words *u*, a negative prefix, and *topos*, “place”. Thus is it realistic for the international community to intend to reach a place that, for the moment, does not exist? Against this seemingly overwhelming objection it should be recalled that Pope Paul VI, in his encyclical *Populorum Progressio*, stated that “the realities of today are the utopias of yesterday”, implying that the utopias of today could become tomorrow’s realities. Leonardo da Vinci sketched aircraft. Today we fly in them. How many bold projects that now surround us are destined to materialize in our children’s lives? Is utopia, therefore, just something that does not exist or, rather, something that does not *yet* exist?

Seen from this perspective, utopia is no longer a mere dream but the vision of a distant but possible future which, when we come to terms with it, frees us from the narrow prison of circumstance. When pointing out the historical role of utopias, Paul VI also criticized the alleged “realism” of those who, like the Apostle Thomas, only accept what they can touch. The fact is that, when we enter the rich universe of utopias, we see that they are divided into several categories. Perhaps the most popular of them is the one that allows us to belittle as utopian those thoughts that are impossible to implement. Those who believe in them seek to realise

immediately, “straightaway”, the horizon of what they want. In this sense, “utopianism” is a misleading aspiration and, ultimately, a form of escapism. Does the universal desire to achieve a world finally free of nuclear weapons perhaps belong to this realm?

Our answer would be a resigned “yes” if we did not realise that, between the harsh reality that surrounds us today, inhabited by black premonitions, and the merely “utopian” dreams that naively aim at overcoming it by means of a supposedly revolutionary voluntarism, an intermediate aspiration is interposed – the “happy medium” – of one day achieving with creativity, continuous efforts and unfaltering patience, the *telos*, the goal we have set ourselves. If Leonardo had intended to fly on his bold drawings, it would have been a mere “utopia” that would have crashed into the hard ground. But the planes that his courageous followers built one day took flight. Faced with the goal of a nuclear-free world, today we are in the same situation as Leonardo’s followers. Someday, perhaps not as distant as some “realists” assume, there will be no more atomic bombs on the face of the Earth. Therefore, what we should aim for is not a mere utopian illusion but rather what we could call a *eutopia* (“good utopia”), which is not only noble in its formulation but also viable in its implementation, recalling that, according to St. Thomas Aquinas “the end, which is the last thing that is realised, is the first thing that is conceived“. No sooner has this been said, however, that we must be aware of the high hurdles, the dangerous distortions, which await us in our long journey ahead.

### *Kant’s “prophecy”*

Prophecies do not only belong to the religious sphere. From time to time the great thinkers also envisioned them. In as far back as 1795 the philosopher Immanuel Kant wrote a short essay in which he prophesied the coming of *Perpetual peace among nations*. But his announcement did not come from a noble utopia whereby, as in the Bible, lions would lie down with lambs and swords would be beaten into ploughshares, but conversely, from his denunciation of the wickedness of those States imbued with a warring mentality which human inventiveness would progressively be providing with ever more destructive weapons. What would happen, wondered the thinker from Königsberg, when these

technologically overdeveloped weapons projected the shadow of their destructive power onto the landscape of Humanity? Alarmed States would begin to weave international treaties to dissipate them because their leaders, although influenced by the atavistic instinct of aggression, would also be animated by elementary prudence.

According to historians of political thought, behind this vision throbbed the anthropological pessimism of Thomas Hobbes when he supposed, in his *Leviathan*, that men would only halt their murderous rage when they saw the ominous consequences of the war of all against all to which they had felt attracted. Hobbes concluded that it was in this lucid interval that men conceived of a “social contract” under which they would give preference to the need for peace over the ancestral temptation of violence as a “lesser evil”, which would be the alternative to the cruel and endless civil war that would otherwise ensue.

While Hobbes was betting on the “social contract” within a single nation and calling on it incidentally justified absolutism in the England of his time, Kant projected the human need to avoid slaughter onto the international arena, towards the “perpetual peace between nations”. The fact is that his survival prophecy was fulfilled a century and a half after it was formulated, when the Soviet Union and the United States, with opposite ideologies but similar claims of universal domination, decided to subscribe to nuclear peace, the “peace of terror” which, by reducing their bipolar war from “hot” to “cold”, made it possible, between 1945, the end of World War II, and 1989-1991, the final years of the Soviet Union, to avoid the outbreak of World War III which, based on the nuclear potential of these countries, would have compromised civilized life on Earth. Inspired by nuclear terror, the only two nuclear superpowers of that era thus decided to give preference to the idea of a “peaceful coexistence” between them over their imperial ambitions.

Therefore, although the “universal common good” which, according to John XXIII in *Pacem in Terris*, is the goal that should be shared by all nations, was not achieved at least the peace of terror led the most powerful of them to avoid “the universal common evil” of mutual destruction. Hasn’t this brief account of what human beings experienced between 1945 and 1991 fulfilled Immanuel Kant’s two hundred-year-old prophecy which is no longer religious but secular?

*Intuitions*

Other more contemporary intuitions confirm the “prophetic” content of certain strategic visions. It is worth mentioning two of them. The first one was expounded by American diplomat George Kennan when he maintained, at the beginning of the Cold War, that the best way to counter the threat of communist totalitarianism would not be a military strike against the Soviet Union – a move that could put the world back on the brink of nuclear disaster, where it had stood just once during the 1962 Cuban missile confrontation, which Kennedy and Khrushchev were able to overcome – but to let communism exhaust its narrow inhumane possibilities while the West focused on containing it within its broad boundaries, until, with the passing of generations, its foreseeable collapse became evident. This intuition led to the so-called strategy of *containment* which, including Cuba, the United States and its allies pursued between 1945 and 1991. Starting from when Mikhail Gorbachev presided over the arrival of a new generation of Soviet leaders, Kennan’s prophecy began to be fulfilled since, in the end, totalitarian communism did not die because of an external attack but because its internal contradictions matured: not by “confrontation” but by “implosion”.

The other intuition that we could single out here was formulated by the Russian political scientist Georgiy Arbatov, who, no sooner had the Soviet Union been declared terminally ill, informed the victors of the Cold War, in an article published in *Foreign Affairs*, of his interpretation according to which the greatest damage that Moscow had caused Washington had not been the deployment of nuclear missiles but something more subtle because, with its ruin, it was leaving the United States “without an enemy”. According to Carl Schmitt’s theory, what defines political action both externally and internally is the disquieting presence of the enemy. The challenge provided by the enemy sharpens the wits and winds the spring of improvement. After defeating the Soviet Union, would the U.S. remain without the paradoxical support of its “enemy”? Arbatov alluded to what had happened to the Roman Republic over two thousand years before when, left in the second century BC without the challenge of Carthage and the Greek cities which hitherto had resisted

to it, ended up dissolving amid fierce civil wars that eventually led it to capitulate to the imperial temptation in the following century.

The West's victory in the Cold War immediately raised the easy optimism of the thesis about the "end of history" that inspired the book that Francis Fukuyama published with this same title, whose hopeful appearance nevertheless was not followed by the universal peace it promised but by a new wave of conflicts and threats, among which we should include not only the terrorist attack on the Twin Towers in New York in 2001 but also the imperial excesses of U.S. President George W. Bush, who, driven by the excesses of unilateralism, placed his country dangerously close to a new "Roman misfortune". Was Arbatov right? Or it is still possible to renew our faith in the future of our world by reaffirming the arduous march toward full nuclear peace?

In *Empires of Trust* (A Plume Book, 2009), American historian Thomas F. Madden maintains that, following the ancient example of the Roman republic, the modern American republic could be on its way to becoming a new "empire of trust" because, like the former, it has managed to convert former enemies such as Germany, Italy and Japan, perhaps even Russia, into its new allies, practically reaching the position where it is set to carve out a *Pax Americana* with them, comparable to the *Pax Romana*. But Madden also warns that the formation of a broad area of peace depends on the rationality of both the victors and the vanquished, and thus is not feasible where fanaticism prevails instead of reason. According to the author, such was the case of the Jewish militants who defied Rome in the first century AD and such is today the deployment of the fundamentalist wing of Islam, which clouds the peaceful coexistence between Islam itself, the Western powers and Israel.

### *The "imperfect peace"*

Returning to Kant's thesis, one must wonder whether the peace among the nations that he predicted was "perfect" or "imperfect". If it were to give rise to a sort of world federation of nations committed to

abandoning all nuclear weapons and punishing those who fail to do so with economic and even military sanctions resulting from a broad international consensus, the new *pax* would be “perfect”, at least as far as perfection is compatible with the human condition. Was the peace announced by Kant as it took shape during the Cold War also perfect? No, because, on a moral level, it did not emanate from a higher philosophical conception derived from high principles such as the old distinction between “just war” and “unjust war” and, indeed, because of the recognition of the sanctity of human life which ultimately results in the fact that “every” war, whoever is responsible for it, presumes the existence of a serious flaw in the international system, but from the fear generated by the invention of weapons of mass destruction, a sentiment that no human being, albeit imperfect but, certainly, “rational”, could escape.

Would peace based solely on nuclear terror, in fact, be “perfect”? To analyze it would be like imagining a group of people who, although distrusting and basically detesting each other, reject the temptation to resort to aggression. This would not be a perfect peace but a peace which, being fragile, would be imperfect. It could be expected that this group of people, despite being inspired by a “Kantian” frame of mind, would give vent to its strong tensions from time to time. This is precisely what happened during the “Kantian” period of the Cold War and beyond, because although there was no nuclear war during that time, conventional wars happened instead such as the Korean and Vietnam wars and local wars such as those waged by India and Pakistan and Iran and Iraq, and even the subsequent rebellions of the Taliban in Afghanistan, first against Russia and later against the United States itself who had previously supported them.

At this point it is worth issuing a warning. When fanaticism, whether religious or ideological, invades the minds of the combatants, what we call “conventional warfare” can be as disturbing, although not as catastrophic, as nuclear war. It would be wrong therefore to limit the vision of “perfect peace” that we long for to the area of weapons of mass destruction, be they nuclear, chemical or biological, because when they are motivated by any kind of fundamentalism, even conventional weapons are capable of reactivating the virus of widespread violence.

Wasn't a small group of extremists capable of destroying the Twin Towers and shaking the world with no other help than some plastic penknives? What must be stressed here is not the "material" deployment of long-range weapons but the emergence of psychological means that block the influence of rationality. If someone is rational, he will contain his hatred of the other within certain limits. But are those people rational who do not hesitate to sacrifice their own lives and the lives of others, of innocent third parties, for what, in their view, is a higher value? From Clausewitz to today, the military doctrine of deterrence has been based on the assumption that the other, the enemy, does not want to die either. However, what happens when the other not only is "not afraid" to die thanks to the virtue of courage in war, but "wants" to die in the name of beliefs instilled in him since childhood? In the frequent cases of suicide terrorism that still surprise rational spectators, the combatant "desires" death and, when he obtains it, his memory is exalted and his family is honoured by the survivors who share his convictions. This is a case that has not been contemplated by the classical theories of war. The fact is that, encouraged by this motivation that is not envisaged under traditional doctrines of armed confrontation, the suicidal bomber, not being deterred by his own fear, becomes something like an unconventional psychological weapon against which no army trained in the military academies has yet found an effective antidote.

This impulse that is inconceivable in the classic doctrines of warfare is ultimately based on *Manichaeism*, on this conception according to which the reprobate and the elect, the dandelion and wheat, have been waging a mortal combat with each another since the origin of time. We should not forget Manichaeism, the heresy that the Persian Mani disseminated in the third century A.D. and which grew on the basis of Persian dualism because it sought to explain the great mystery of evil that all religions tried to exorcise to respond to the disquieting question of why an infinitely wise, good and powerful God could create a world where sin and injustice abound, maintaining that there is not a single God but two, the good Ormuz and the evil Ahriman, the former responsible for the creation of all that is good and the latter for the creation of all that is evil in our world. From Mani onwards, Manichaeism affected all fundamentalists, whether or not of Christian origin, includ-

ing some variants of Muslim Shiism. Its fullest expression in our time was the Ayatollah Khomeini, as he himself demonstrated when, being asked which was worse, the United States or the Soviet Union, he replied that “the United States is worse even than the Soviet Union, which is worse even than the United States” because, in his opinion, both represented Satan, who is the new Ahriman of our times. If someone decides to fight in the legion of good against the legion of evil, be it capitalist or communist, will he ever be able to contain his fury, with the help of rationality, or on the contrary will he be motivated to use any excess, any violence, if they seem to support his apocalyptic battle? Here is a motivation that allows the Manichaean combatant to go out and kill or die in good conscience, flatly contradicting the Aristotelian definition of prudence, that eminently rational virtue consisting in the willingness to perceive and accept what is, in each case, good for man and also violating the venerable principle according to which the first care of every living organism is, for now, “to persist in being”.

### *The doctrine of “just war”*

There is a large gap between formulating the great human ideals and achieving them in the elusive reality. At the ideal level, various doctrines have tried to channel toward a successful conclusion the most destructive human passions. From the moment the impetuous development of nuclear energy in recent times seems to predict both the huge benefits its peaceful applications promise and the terrible damage that lurks behind its possible military application, the opposition between these two nuclear horizons has reached a point that seems to come close, in fact, a new version of Manichaeism. On the one hand, the peaceful use of nuclear energy, if extended as promised, could overcome many human deficiencies in vital areas such as energy and medicine. On the other, if the development of nuclear energy is not contained within the discipline of peace, it could lead to unimaginable evil. In these two areas, both the promise and threat of nuclear development appear to go beyond the current conditions of life on Earth, arriving at a point near the angels, and on the opposite side, near the devil. This is why it is so urgent to accurately distinguish one from the other.

The rejection of the war content of atomic development could bind in this respect, with the venerable doctrine of just war. According to what the scholastics developed since ancient times, a war, to be considered “just” from the moral perspective, must meet several conditions. The first is that, responding to St. Thomas’ definition of peace as “the tranquillity of an order”, war should always be “defensive” and never “offensive” because it must be the appropriate response to external aggression to protect one’s territory and population. Going to war must be considered in this regard, as the “last resort” of those nations with a sense of justice. It is this condition that enables *power* to be separated conceptually from *violence* because, while the use of force as a regrettable but acceptable hypothesis is available to populations who feel threatened in their freedom and integrity by a voracious aggressor, violence, which, like force, is also etymologically connected to the Latin *vis*, “vigour”, leaves the door open to the possibility of transforming force into “violence”, into a tumultuous and uncontrollable force whose proximity with strength results from the fact that both occupy the same branch of the etymological tree.

Clausewitz himself, in his theory of war, emphasized the moral superiority of defenders who protect their own freedom, their own territory, against the insolence, against the unlimited greed of the invaders, an advantage which has so often in history caused the failure of the conquerors, from Pyrrhus to Hannibal and from Napoleon to Hitler. But not even the defendants have *carte blanche* in the moral field, since the just war doctrine also provides that the means they employ must be “proportional” to the incumbent threat. Not far from this other condition is the old doctrine stating that, in any case, the clash of military forces involved should not harm civilians and particularly not cities. The massive bombing of London first and later Germany during World War II clearly violated these limits, even if only by using conventional weapons. We should recall the example of Frederick the Great of Prussia, who in the mid-eighteenth century refused to take enemy cities because he still regarded the war as a “tournament” that armies should carry out only in a previously settled upon “battlefield”.

Every war, even defensive wars, inevitably borders on the danger of “escalation” because a circumscribed confrontation in the beginning

can easily overflow into even more serious situations than any of the belligerents foresee. Note the magnificent description of the beginnings of World War I that Henry Kissinger wrote in his book *Diplomacy*, when whole armies moved against each other by a sort of fatal inertia, infinitely multiplying the serious but precise damage that the murder of an Austrian prince had caused. Finally, one should add here a condition also applied to the analysis of the just rebellions against an unbearable tyrant: the carriers of a “force” that is acceptable in principle, once it is deployed have to be able to count on a reasonable chance of success otherwise both internal tyranny and external aggression could multiply cruelly because of the reaction of the offenders to the initial innocence of the oppressed peoples and defending States, once they have beaten them victoriously.

As stated here, the traditional doctrine of just war excludes in more than one point the use of nuclear weapons. Firstly, because atomic explosions, due to their uncontrollable magnitude, would not respect civil societies. Secondly, because scaling from conventional weapons to nuclear weapons would violate the principle of proportionality. As a brief appendix, let’s add that even the use of nuclear weapons called “tactical” or “minor” should be banned because it would entail the imminent risk of “escalation”.

### *Easier said than done*

Since we have already established that one thing is the enunciation of the principles that preclude the use of nuclear weapons and quite another is to actually implement these principles, we should now review a number of “intermediate” situations.

At the moment there is a danger that non-nuclear countries, upon being excluded from the “nuclear club”, will feel discriminated against by a sort of “oligarchy of nations”, some of which are also among the most powerful and richest on the planet. All countries, big and small, have the right to promote their nuclear development for peaceful purposes. Doesn’t this include the possibility that some non-nuclear countries will perceive that, under the pretext of preventing them from gaining access to nuclear arsenals, the “peaceful” development of their

nuclear potential is in fact being conditioned? It thus seems logical that those countries that feel discriminated against will require that, at the same time as they are forbidden from accessing the nuclear club, nuclear nations set an example, gradually destroying their nuclear arsenals.

Perhaps the nuclear powers should accept that, in certain cases, the efforts of some non-nuclear countries to get closer to the bomb are not aimed in actual fact at competing with large nuclear nations like the USA or Russia in the military field, something which is simply unthinkable, but at increasing their international prestige. Having the bomb would raise the “status” of any thus far non-nuclear country. But we must also recognize that perhaps other non-nuclear countries are pursuing the bomb for specific military reasons connected with their undemocratic ideological fervour, as might be the case of Iran, or to be able to count on a powerful weapon of extortion, as might be the case of North Korea. In some particularly tense areas like the Middle East, isn't it understandable on the other extreme that particularly vulnerable small nations like Israel will build up against others that have promised to erase them from the face of the Earth their own atomic arsenal, even when they do not admit it, because they believe this risky strategy is their passport to survival?

When a nation has stable democratic institutions, isn't this a political condition that enables it to be considered a “mature nation”, since the natural pacifism of its people will eventually weigh upon the decisions of its rulers, while other States, for refusing to be thoroughly checked by the United Nations inspectors, naturally become suspicious of pursuing a clandestine nuclear development in the military field? There are, in that sense, “transparent” and “opaque” nations. That the latter, but not the former, should have to undergo severe international scrutiny should not surprise us.

The ideal world we are looking for would be achieved if “all” the nations that comprise it reached the high level of the democratic and transparent regimes. A significant proportion of the nations of our time today meet these two vital conditions. The fact is that, if we were to list nuclear and non-nuclear nations, while a majority of them appear transparent and, if not fully democratic, at least having an orderly and predictable system, a few would give rise to the reasonable prejudices

of the international community. Would a world where most nations gave us assurances of nuclear abstention be satisfactory? And how should we treat the small minority of unreliable countries? Wouldn't it be inevitable, in this case, to consider them dangerous? Albeit being a minority case, this list should include those countries which, because of their acute economic or institutional underdevelopment, could be considered "failed states" and therefore unreliable because they are not able to channel their own turmoil. This is where Pakistan would come in, as a nuclear nation troubled by instability.

I would now like to introduce a paragraph on non-state organisations which, nevertheless, possess or could possess a disturbing nuclear aptitude. Such is the case of international terrorism. Whereas until now we have concentrated our attention on the approximately 200 sovereign states that compose the international community today, as soon as we descend from this level to that of non-state organisations promoting terrorism, international control becomes, in this case, highly problematic.

Nevertheless one has to register the "irregularity" of today's world. Alongside countries such as Brazil and Argentina, who have freely chosen to abandon the nuclear arms race that they had undertaken thus facilitating, thanks to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the fact that Latin America was declared a nuclear-free region, there are other countries that have turned their nuclear programmes into an instrument of influence and even of international power. We should acknowledge here that the spirit of peace that is replacing old tensions such as the religious ones between Catholics and Protestants, or the ideological tension between European communists and democracy, is perhaps nothing more than the limited expression of a "peace among Western nations" which does not extend to other regions of the globe, whose past frustrations still drive them towards a broad and essentially resentful grievance. In this sense can Muslim countries forget that Islam was, until recent centuries, a civilization more advanced than the European one?

Another question in this section remains to be answered: how should peaceful nations treat those other nations that still exhibit dangerous offending symptoms in the margins of international order? Wouldn't these nations be more sensitive to an effective policy of incentives in exchange for the promise of military denuclearization, an

incentive that they have not yet been offered? Or should we conclude instead that those States that prove to be immune to all incentives and negotiations would at least experience acute concern when faced with a relentless system of international sanctions?

*Between the abyss and the peak*

Some of the above considerations limit our optimism. Should we then stop aiming at establishing a peaceful and nuclear-free world? There will certainly be obstacles and frustrations in the rough road towards the ultimate goal, and many difficulties still lie ahead on our journey. But faced with these difficult prospects we should also ask ourselves what would ultimately be our choice if the long struggle for universal peace concretized in a sort of federation of peaceful, militarily non-nuclear nations, were to be abandoned. Even the nuclear competition between the two superpowers raised at the time the prospect of their mutual assured destruction, which the inventors of the acronym "MAD", "mutual assured destruction", described as the expression of an extreme case of collective madness with the end of the world as a backdrop. Faced with the spectacle of tens of thousands of nuclear warheads that are still in the arsenals of the great powers, this dark threat cannot be discarded. Merely contemplating it is enough to make us understand that the path towards nuclear disarmament, with all its limitations, is not only the "best" one but also the *only* acceptable one.

Discarding the logic of mass destruction that is still rooted in the deepest recesses of the States, what can we think of the other case of MAD, of the other kind of "craziness" that is still incubating in a few terrorist minds in the margins of the official policy of the States? Let's try a thought experiment here. If the action of twenty or so terrorists armed only with plastic penknives affected the world and its most powerful nation less than ten years ago, can we imagine the chaos that would be created not by a terrorist attack like the one we have experienced but, infinitely beyond that, by the explosion of atomic bombs in some of the largest cities, not with thousands but with millions of deaths? The intemperate reaction of President Bush over the attack on

the Twin Towers in that case would be dwarfed, diminished, compared to this other unimaginable but not impossible shock.

If we were to think along these lines we might even accommodate the most worrying of all nightmares that some scientists have already forecast imagining that, in its millions of years of life, the universe must have already experienced a nuclear apocalypse of ancient civilizations more advanced than ours of which we have no record, but which the folly of man could convene in due course; this would be, if not the end of the universe as such, certainly the end of "our" world, the world that the Creator entrusted to us.

At the end of this account the founded suspicion emerges that human civilization is racing towards a crossroads that prohibits any ambivalence because it either rises to the top of a federation of nations that exorcise nuclear extortion, or is headed towards an unthinkable catastrophe. Finally, let us say that, against this terrible projection of pessimism, we also possess some transcendent visions such as the one that the Blessed Joaquín de Fiore described when he prophesied, still in the Middle Ages, that world history could be divided into three broad ages, which in turn reflected the mystery of the Trinity: firstly the age of the Father, which corresponds to the onset of the Jewish people in history; secondly the age of the Son, which coincides with the Christian civilization, and thirdly the age of the Holy Spirit, which was destined to witness the ecumenical conjunction of Jews, Christians and Muslims, of the three Abrahamic religions, in the peaceful recognition of one God who, with different names, at the end of the day is one and the same. De Fiore's daring prophecy was quoted again by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger when he was appointed to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, before becoming Pope Benedict XVI.

*During the Study Day the author added the following commentary to his paper*

I came here with a paper, now I think I am a little beyond the paper I brought here so I would like to sum up all the things I learned in this journey. Now, to learn – all of you are university professors – to learn is to have more questions than you had when you started learning. This is my case this evening. In the first place, I think I learned to be humble about predictions because we all lived through a long period in which our major fear was a nuclear war between a Soviet Union and the United States. This fear never became concrete, never came to reality and what was astonishing for us was that small conflicts, non atomic conflicts, spread through the world with the last irony that the greatest impact of violence in the last ten years was a suicide bomber attacking New York, the Twin Towers, with a penknife. A penknife is the most primitive of weapons. This is irony, the paradox. At that moment President Bush was covering himself with all these antimissile systems and they came with a penknife and what is important about that is that the penknife put President Bush in a personal crisis. You remember that he said to his collaborators, “Now I am a war President”. So, I say, first to become humble about our predictions. The second conclusion I dare to have this evening is that in fact the world is populated by a lot of democracies but political power in the international field is oligarchic. Why is it oligarchic? Because we have less than ten countries that are nuclear. In the countries that are nuclear I take it that the great non-confessed principle is, the last that comes in closes the door. So, well, there were five, now eight, but there is the idea that the nuclear club is a privileged club and I understand that they do not want anymore to become nuclear but this is felt by the other ones as a discrimination. Why can my country not enter the nuclear club? And also, from the other point of view, you see there is another oligarchy here at play: if you look at, I think there are 195 nations in the world now, the large majority are non dangerous from the nuclear point of view. They are peaceful. But it is enough cause of fear that only three or four of them want to break the barrier and come like violent countries so it is not a valid statement to say that nearly all the countries are non nuclear or do not want proliferation. It is enough for three or four countries to break this rule and create a big fear now, a new fear in the world.

I think this problem of oligarchy goes directly to the idea of peace as an expression of justice. If some countries feel they are not treated with some justice you will not have a perpetual peace as Kant dreamed of one day.

And now, to come to a third point I would like to put: motivations are complex because, in fact, I do not know how to put it but the nuclear development, the nuclear weapons, perhaps had peaceful consequences because I think, in all this study day, perhaps we are not regarding intensely the danger of conventional weapons. After all, the big manslaughters of all this century were with conventional weapons and perhaps some countries had some valid reason to say, look, if I do not become nuclear my conventional superiority will break down. I was thinking about Israel, it is true that Israel proved superior to the Arab armies in the conventional field. But it is easy to think that Israel may think that if Iran becomes nuclear, and I do not know how many bombs you need to wipe out Israel from the map, perhaps two, so it is logical for them, in a way, to appeal to nuclear deterrence as an effective way to preserve their peace, at least.

And the other question that was very well analysed by Professor Derbez Bautista is “prestige anxiety”, in the sense that, if you have a world in which only seven or eight countries have the nuclear weapons potentiality, the others feel in some way undervalued because they are not members of that exclusive club. And this is where the problem of prestige comes in. A country is going to be more respected than before if it acquires a nuclear weapon, even if it does not intend to use it, it is only that they have it, like a luxury car, you go out and everybody looks at you. And there comes what we saw in the discussion, the problem of Brazil, with our Mexican friends here. Brazil, perhaps you can classify Brazil as an almost nuclear country, in the sense that there are some countries that everybody knows that if they put themselves to the task they can become nuclear quite quickly and there the question is, how do you persuade Brazil not to become nuclear and convincing Brazil that even then it will become a very respected and prestigious country. The big countries, Brazil is the only big country that is not nuclear. China, Russia, India are all nuclear. So this, I think, poses a very profound question. What is the list of motivations that can bring

a country in the upper class of nations without becoming nuclear? Here I think we have two very interesting examples with Germany and Japan. They do not have any intention as far as we know of becoming nuclear and, in spite of that, they are very prestigious nations. So I think that the problem with Brazil is to find Brazil some place in the world, for instance a permanent presence in the Security Council, that will satisfy the Brazilian ego, say, without the necessity to inspire fear in the rest of Latin America, which is a non nuclear zone.

So I think there is a great failure, what I learned today, I think it is a great lack of analysis of the real balance of motivations we need to get into a non nuclear world because either we promote incentives, non nuclear incentives for some important countries or we instil fear in them through sanctions. I think all this world, this constellation of incentives and sanctions is not well studied, it is underdeveloped in a way.

Here there is another point I think is very interesting, looking into motivations. Prestige motivation is rational: you can say, well, you are committing the sin of pride but you are rational, I want this and I get that. The other problem, I think, in the sphere of motivations are non-rational targets, that some conducts are, as we see them, non-rational. I was telling in my paper what is the residual presence of Manichaeism in our world. If the other is evil, I am the good one. A combat is nearly unavoidable between us. So I was telling in my paper this anecdote by Ayatollah Khomeini when they asked him, who is worse, the United States or the Soviet Union? And he said, "The United States is worse than the Soviet Union which is worse than the United States", they are all Satanic expressions so none is worse than the other. Now this residuum, in a way, there are fanatics that are looking for this outcome in the world and so they are very very dangerous. I would like to put, at this point of my dissertation, what Aristotle would call an *aporia*, a road without an apparent way out. The *aporia* would be this: we have lived through 30-40 years of trembling and fearing an atomic war between great actors and the maximum impact worldwide was, as I said before, fifteen or twenty Manicheans with a penknife and my new fear is this one: you saw what this did to President Bush, he became altered. I was in the United States in those days, all the American people became completely altered, not the rest of the world but there they were altered, there was a sort of incomprehension between the

Americans and the rest at that moment. So let us put ourselves in this scenario: imagine that these twenty fanatics would have been armed with an atomic device. Which would have been the political consequences for the United States of that type of shock? After all, well, it is horrible, but 3,000 people were killed. Imagine if half a million people had been killed. What would be the psychology, as I think Professor Höfle said, what would be the human reaction of any President, more Bush but for any other one? Because all the nations would be completely shocked, out of control. So what I really fear, my great fear now is this type of scenario: a group of terrorists carrying out an atomic threat in some big city and what would be the psychological consequences of this shock for the authorities, for the people, for everybody.

There I would like to underline, we are, all the time, and this is correct, imagining technological advances in all fields and really they are quicker than our imagination but I think we did not analyse enough that the suicide bomber is an absolutely new psychological device in history because all the theory of war from Clausewitz to now, implies that the other one has fear. The other one does not want to die. He may be heroic, courageous, but even the courageous soldier does not look to die, he risks dying, it is not the same. Now this group of people wants to die. Now, if your enemy wants to die, which would be the argument to stop him? I remember a book, there was an attack in Mogadishu some years ago, there were some terrorists in a plane, and the pilot told them, "Don't you realise that we and you are going to die?" And the terrorist said, "I am already dead". Now, how do you use persuasion and dissuasion? So I think that this also has to be analysed, the presence of a superweapon, a superweapon created vis-à-vis the poverty of means of a penknife but tomorrow, vis-à-vis an atomic bomb of people from all the madrassas who are mentally prepared, practically since they are born, to give their lives for a cause. I do not know quite how Clausewitz would have responded, how can you dissuade such a person? Because, in fact, all this Kantian idea of perpetual peace is based on the rationality of people that, being evil, they do not want to go to the extremes of their weakness and they stop somewhere. That was the Cold War, we may not cross this line, not because we are very good persons, we are simply rational, we do not want to

die. Now, against this anti-utopia – this is an anti-utopia, it looks like 1984, imagine a world in which these things could happen – I put in my paper a utopia, or as I say there, a *eutopia*, a good utopia, and my paper ended remembering that Cardinal Ratzinger, who was allowed to this Academy, remembered in his paper the case of Gioacchino da Fiore, who was a sort of prophet, who in the 12<sup>th</sup> century prophesized, in a way, that after the Age of the Father, Judaism, the Age of the Son, which is Christianity, would come the Age of the Holy Spirit in which the three large religions, the three Abrahamic religions, would join. Now, as it has been said several times in this meeting, if there is a change of heart and, for instance, the three large religions start to really converge, then a lot of these problems would not be discussed, but this change of heart still has not occurred.

Now, this is where I support myself and Professor Höfle: he is all the time talking about a vision of values and I would like to present, in the last part of this presentation, the contrast between rational ends and values, for instance we have studied the development of this. If you are rational, if you save something and you invest what you save and then you get to do it again and again you get development, the Puritan ethic. But why does this not happen? Because the rational motivation is weak. Instead, and I ask forgiveness to all the priests here, what I would call temptation, temptation is the attraction of the short term, the short term attracts you. The long term, you remember Ovid saying, I prefer the good and then I act badly, rationally it is better but I do not do it, because rationality is weak. So I rather prefer a bird in hand now and not perhaps one hundred birds some years from now or some decades from now. So, if you recognise the weakness of the rational long-term analysis you only have values. For instance I could say, look, I will not steal, because if I do not steal I become prestigious, people will respect me, and eventually I will be able create a company which everybody supports, but this motivation is very difficult when you are in the presence of one million dollars on the table. So why do you not pick the million dollars? Because you are an honest person, simply because you are not allowed by your conscience to do it. This is a value. That is why values are so important because you obey values even without considering the consequences of your actions.

So I fully agree, really, and the times I have come here, I was reading all the Pontifical documents and you sometimes have the feeling that the Pope's analysis is wishful thinking, until you realise that we are, in fact, between two visions of value and disvalue and that the last question we have ahead of us is moral. Morals are too important to say, no, that is moral, as a second thought on things, and that really the last stance of this dilemma is in the human heart. So I prefer to think in the long-range period, but in the long long range if you get this Gioacchino da Fiore vision coming slowly into reality you will be solving not only a nuclear problem but a lot of moral problems that still assail us. Thank you very much.